



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

### Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

### About Google Book Search


Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>





6000812610

~~200-6-44~~







A FULL AND FREE  
I N Q U I R Y  
I N T O T H E  
Merits of the Peace;  
W I T H S O M E  
S T R I C T U R E S  
On the Spirit of Party.

---

“ I love to pour out all myself; as plain  
“ As downright Shippen, or as old Montaign :  
“ In them, as certain to be lov'd as seen,  
“ The soul stood forth, nor kept a thought within;  
“ In me what spots (for spots I have) appear,  
“ Will prove at least the medium must be clear.”

POPE.

“ *Pro Rege sapie, pro Republica semper.*”

SHEFFIELD.

---

L O N D O N :

Printed for T. PAYNE, next the Mews-Gate, in Castle-  
Street, St. Martin's; and sold at the Pamphlet-Shops.

MDCCLXV.


226. i. 373.



## E R R A T A.

**P**AGE 84. l. 1. for, *side of limitation*, read, *side of the line of limitation*. l. 7. for, *Mobile*, read, *Mobile*.—P. 101. l. 17. for, *rectified compleatly*, read, *rectified it compleatly*.—P. 103. l. 14. after, *century* put the *comma*, dele *at least*, and before *without* insert, *even*. l. 15. for *would have*, read, *would not have*.—P. 126. l. 7. for, *will be who*, read, *will be he who*.—P. 139. l. 20. for, *distant*, read, *distinct*.—P. 143. l. 17. for 1715, read, 1745.—P. 144. l. 14, 15. for, *were what we heard of*, read, *were what were heard of*.—P. 147. l. 6. for, *apartments*, read, *departments*.—P. 149. l. 21. for, *the forces*, read, *the Tories*.—P. 155. l. 15. for, *been driving*, read, *been seen driving*. — P. 157. l. 4. for, *contracted*, read, *contrasted*. — P. 159. l. 22. for, *the founded confidence*, read, *the best-founded confidence*.—P. 160. l. 3. after, *establishment*, dele *comma*, and read, *establishment of the glory*.





A  
FULL AND FREE ENQUIRY  
INTO THE  
MERITS OF THE PEACE, &c.

**G**REAT Britain, in the course of the last war, ran a career of glory, transcendently superior to every former period of her duration. Victory and conquest attended her arms in every quarter of the world : for in Europe, in Asia, in Africa and America, the enemy and his allies were not only baffled, but vanquished. Her subjects became immensely enriched ; her trade and commerce vastly extended ; joy, confidence and exultation sat on every countenance ; and pleasure, luxury and dissipation reigned with unbounded sway throughout all her triumphant dominions.

B

IN

IN the midst of this unexampled felicity, her exchequer was emptied, her public state and government not only impoverished, but so deeply involved in debt, that she seemed on the brink of dissolution; for long before this time it had been fixed and established as a maxim, that it was impossible for her to sustain a load, tho' lighter by many millions than what she now did, without being inevitably sunk by it into bankruptcy and ruin.

CERTAIN it is, that her acquisitions in trade as well as in territory, and the riches and spoils arising from the prosperous events of the war, had raised her credit and enlarged her annual supplies far beyond her natural ability; supplies nevertheless which were but only sufficient for maintaining her internal tranquility, securing her foreign conquests, and accumulating distress upon the enemy, by fresh enterprizes, and distant expensive and powerful expeditions. But as certain  
it

it is, that whilst her subjects were thus solidly enriched by the happy contingent success of her public exploits, and even by the opportunities given them of fleecing her in the necessary loans they advanced for enabling her to make themselves great and happy; she herself was becoming every day more weak, more indigent and distressed: and ornamented with the fairest laurels by land and by sea, was advancing every moment farther and farther within the ruthless gripe of undertakers, contractors, and alley jobbers. In short her credit, and consequently her power and importance, wholly depended on the fortuitous events of the war, and the interested views of money-holders.

WHILST her enlarged and very extensive trade demanded hands for her manufactures and the navigation of her merchandize; her agriculture stood in need of labourers, and her enfeebled armies and fleets wanted daily recruits of men to supply the havock of war and the pesti-

lential destruction of foreign climes. Yet was the nation already drained by the numerous levies formerly made for all those purposes ; and the necessary policy of extending and carrying on the war still farther in the sultry regions of the south, where alone the enemy was vulnerable, produced a clear assurance and certainty, from the destructiveness of those climates to northern constitutions, that whether successful or unfortunate in our future adventures, and whether employed in defending the places and countries that had been already conquered, or in invading and assaulting others not yet attempted, all those wants and demands would increase more and more, without any probability or hope that the state should be in a capacity to afford fresh and adequate reinforcements, or even make the establishment effective as it then stood. On the other hand, Great Britain saw herself every where victorious, possessed of many fair places and countries taken from the enemy, with a clear and undisputable superiority

periority in the ocean. This situation gave just ground to expect a solid, honourable and advantageous peace : And these her internal and external circumstances being duly attended to and dispassionately considered, will present a conjuncture of flattering felicity combined with imminent danger, infinitely superior to whatever had happened in her history ; that of having her strength and powers exerted with a constant flow of prosperity, sufficient to inspire the strongest desire of proceeding impetuously on, under the presumptuous confidence that fortune was unalterably chained to her side : whilst that strength and those powers having been already stretched to their utmost extent, every subsequent effort must have only discovered her weakness, and lost her the advantages she possessed of making a peace most conducive to her interest happiness and grandeur. For in this respect it is the same in a collective body or state, as in any individual person ; who having stretched

stretched and exerted his strength and powers to the very utmost of his vigour, all after-efforts to increase and carry them further, serve but to impair debilitate and exhaust him. Whoever then will attentively consider this nice, this important and critical conjuncture, may perceive the point of time which the spirit of wisdom and disinterested patriotism would have laid hold on for putting an end to the enmity subsisting between the several contending powers, and establishing a peace to the true emolument and benefit of our country. But if we extend our view still further, and include the generous motives of sympathy and compassion in stopping the effusion of human blood, terminating the desolations of war, and giving repose to Europe; it may then appear not only wise and patriotic, but an act of the highest and most exalted benevolence, and such as well became the dignity of That King, who is the Father of his People, and the Friend of Man.

HAD

HAD no division and separation happened prior to this in the administration ; had Mr P, who so justly acquired the admiration and confidence of the nation, occupied still the department of state which he had held during the heat of the war, and been agreed and united with the rest of the King's servants in accommodating a peace at this point of time : although an opposition might have been undoubtedly made to it from that martial spirit which now in general prevailed among the people, who having been worked up to an inveterate hatred and contempt of the enemy, and become arrogant by uninterrupted success, could relish and approve of nothing but victories and conquests ; and from those individuals whose interest and fortunes depended on the continuance of the war : still such an opposition must soon have died away before a ministry so firm, so beloved and respected, as in that case the British ministry would have been ; and  
the



the propriety fitness and utility of the transaction would have appeared of itself, upon cool reflection, and how necessary and perfectly conducive it was to the security happiness and dignity of the nation. But that universal harmony and national concord which formerly subsisted, had been for some time before this unhappily interrupted and broken.

A judicious preconception of the popular distraction of mind arising from this haughty martial spirit, become impetuous undiscerning and intractable in the height of prosperity, might well have induced Mr P, from the best conceived principles of political prudence as well as of humanity, to lay hold of the earliest events of our successes abroad, to invite the enemy to terms of accommodation and peace: and at length to declare, that although he had undertaken and would answer for the vigorous prosecution of the war, yet would he not engage, from the foresight he had of the difficulties  
springing

springing up out of the very greatness and importance of our conquests, to regulate the terms of our future peace. Now whatever strong and efficacious reasons justified this declaration and conduct at that time, those very same reasons did annually become stronger and more efficacious, according to the degree of our success, and the new acquisitions that we made; for in proportion as these advantages grew upon us, the public temper waxed more violent and insatiable, our national strength of men became more weakened, and the state itself was still farther involved and incumbered, by the vast and extraordinary supplies to be provided for carrying on the war.

UNDER these perplexing, but inevitable circumstances, peace was concluded: a peace that was arraigned and condemned in daily and periodical papers, before it was known, or could be known, what the terms and conditions of it were; a

C

peace,

peace, that when its preliminary articles were made known, was stigmatized and held forth to the people as inglorious, inadequate and disadvantageous ; a peace, that being finally adjusted and ratified, after having had its preliminaries examined debated and almost unanimously approved of by parliament, was and is made a handle of to create party, obstruct government, and animate the people to discontent, if not to sedition.

How far these strong and heavy censures, past upon this peace, are just equitable and truly patriotic, will best appear from examining into the merits of the peace itself ; and in doing of this, let the genuine spirit of candour truth and honour, direct our dispassionate inquiry.

The great and universal principle of the law of humanity, the law of nature, and the christian law, is intirely one and the same. “ Do unto others that which you would have them do unto you,” and  
 “ Do

springing up out of the very greatness and importance of our conquests, to regulate the terms of our future peace. Now whatever strong and efficacious reasons justified this declaration and conduct at that time, those very same reasons did annually become stronger and more efficacious, according to the degree of our success, and the new acquisitions that we made; for in proportion as these advantages grew upon us, the public temper waxed more violent and insatiable, our national strength of men became more weakened, and the state itself was still farther involved and incumbered, by the vast and extraordinary supplies to be provided for carrying on the war.

UNDER these perplexing, but inevitable circumstances, peace was concluded: a peace that was arraigned and condemned in daily and periodical papers, before it was known, or could be known, what the terms and conditions of it were; a

C

peace,

sovereign or state. Any sovereign or state, when injured, has a right to demand and receive satisfaction of the sovereign or state who committed the injury. Satisfaction being refused; the sovereign or state injured, has hence a right to have recourse to force, and to exert all his own power, and the power of his allies, to obtain satisfaction. This is the just and universal right of war. But satisfaction being made, or offered to be made by the aggressor to the injured prince or state; should that not be accepted of, the just and universal right of war, appertaining to the party injured, ceases: and however powerful and successful the injured prince or state may afterwards prove, all the exertions of that power, and all the succeeding victories obtained by it, are so many real injuries committed by such a prince or state against him who happened to be the first aggressor; inasmuch that he will have a right, in his turn, to demand and receive satisfaction. The truth of this reasoning is  
freely

freely submitted to every man's own feelings. He has but to apply the principle laid down to the different cases stated, putting himself by turns in the situation of the opposite party; and the natural constitution and movements of his own spirit will fairly determine the rest. Here then is a criterion by which I propose to try the merits of this peace.

THE limits of Nova Scotia or Acadia, presented the first object of dispute between the two crowns of Great Britain and France. The peace of Aix la Chapelle had left this point to the discussion of commissaries to be nominated on each side for that purpose. This discussion was protracted. The French erected forts in the heart of that very province whose boundaries were then the subject of enquiry. They established a chain of posts and garrisons from thence, over an immense tract of country, as far as the banks of the Mississippi. They cut off not only his majesty's subjects from all intercourse with the Indian nations, and  
the

the inland rivers and lakes, the source of commerce and future improvements; but held the whole British dominion in North America in such a manner at their discretion, as to be capable to invade, or over-run it, so as through it to open to themselves a communication with the sea at pleasure. These operations of the French gave rise to expostulation complaint and demands of satisfaction, on the part of Great Britain. These demands were not attended to, satisfaction was not made; and, on that account, a just, a necessary, and prosperous war ensued. At length, after a series of distinguished and heroic actions, the sovereign will of Heaven, and the signal valour of the British arms, reduced the enemy to terms of moderation, and a sincere desire of peace.

To have withdrawn their garrisons, to have relinquished their new-erected forts, and to have admitted the limits of Nova Scotia to have been such as they  
them-

themselves had described them when that country was in their own possession; would have been, previous to the war, a full fair and ample satisfaction. The matter referred by the peace of Aix la Chapelle to future discussion, would have been thereby intirely settled; and that peace, itself, fixed upon a more solid and permanent foundation. This was all that we could have asked; this was, indeed, all that we did ask.

AT adjusting the late peace, that is now under consideration, not only these limits and forts became our intire right and property : but to indemnify and compensate for the injuries that had been done by erecting the forts and refusing to admit the claimed limits, which two objects were the only cause and source of the war ; the crown of France ceded all Canada Cape-Breton and St John in the north, all Louisiana north and east of the river Mississippi in the south, and all the immense lands rivers and lakes  
lying



lying between them, with all their towns forts islands and dependances: Regions of such vast extent as to comprehend every climate and every soil, therefore fruitful resources for every kind of art industry and invention; larger in dimension than the half of Europe, and much more capable of every kind of improvement; and which, in their population and cultivation, will give scope to human genius and human industry for ages to come. The very length of time that it demands to improve and cultivate them, lays the surest and best foundations for the future strength riches and grandeur of Great Britain; and for our colonies themselves becoming a great and mighty empire, under the influence and direction of the mother country; or of standing forth to the world her illustrious and august heir and representative, when in the impenetrable depths of futurity, by some hostile foreign stroke, or some more dreadful internal convulsion, the effects of corruption prostitution  
and

and self-interested faction, Great Britain shall be no more.

WHAT were the sentiments of the nation before and during the war?— That our colonies in North America merited the first and chief attention and care of their mother country; that the progress they had made since their settlement, the shipping they employed, the manufactures they consumed, the returns they were capable of making in various articles and commodities that were supplied us by foreign nations; the treasure they were capable of acquiring upon a due encouragement being given to their trade, which would ultimately circulate home: all these, and the great capacity they had of enlarging and extending all these, made them not only an object preferable to all others, but of such essential importance, that the nation might continue to grow rich and great and powerful, by her intercourse with them only, were she deprived

D

of

of every other means of commerce. That the importance of this object was still increased from this consideration, that most and some of the greatest powers of Europe had opened their eyes and given their attention to trade : that hence by its becoming more general, and by many nations supplying themselves with what we were formerly in use to furnish them, or to carry for them, the trade itself was become less extensive in our hands, and the profits arising from it very considerably diminished.—That we were already outdone in some branches, and overreached in others.—That under these circumstances, our colonies in this new world of our own were our only and best refuge ; and our future happiness depended upon improving them.—That environed as they were by French encroachments, French forts and French communications ; cut off as they were from the fairest richest and best part of the country by French settlements and garrisons on the Ohio, the Mississippi, and

and the lakes; these very colonies, our last resource, were in the most imminent danger: that nothing too great, nothing too expensive, nothing too hazardous could be undertaken for their relief: every thing was to be attempted; for the time was now come for trial, and a trial not to be avoided, whether Great Britain or France excelled as a naval power.

I appeal, with all the respect and confidence that truth inspires, to those gentlemen who still live and were then in the administration, whether the voice of our colonies in memorials addresses and applications did not inculcate and press upon them these sentiments. I appeal to the greater and smaller publications, to almost every production of the press in those times, for the illustration and proof of them. But chiefly and above all, I appeal to my fellow countrymen of every rank and order, in place and out of place, inclined to this or that set of men, whigs or tories; and chiefly to

those who are inviolably attached to truth, independent of the interest of any party or faction of men, whether these sentiments were not universal? Whether they were not the sentiments and spirit of the nation? Whether this spirit did not at length make an impression upon the gentlemen that were in the administration at that time, and impel them, in spite of their almost inflexible indolence and love of peace, to a species of warlike measures which in a course of time produced the war itself? Whether in the vigorous and spirited prosecution of the war, the same sentiments the same spirit did not guide the administration and the nation? Whether views, solely influenced by these sentiments, did not direct the discussions of the peace so far as they were discussed by Mr P? And whether they did not continue to be the sentiments of the nation, as well [as administration, at the eve of the peace itself, negotiated and concluded by his majesty's servants?

HOLDING

HOLDING as undoubtedly certain, that these motives of the war were just, and these sentiments of the nation true ; let the merits of the peace be considered as relative to both.

ENVIRONED, O Britain, as your colonies were by hostile forts; this peace has converted them into forts of defence and security. Checked and encroached upon in the limits of Acadia; this peace hath extended those limits to your utmost wishes. Excluded and cut off from the fairest and richest regions of North America, from the rivers and the lakes; this peace has made these coveted and envied situations all your own. The fruits of the enemies indefatigable invention, labour, wit, improvement and expence, for upwards of a century, are all your own. These colonies, whose prosperity, without any other commercial connections, were sufficient to have supported your riches your greatness and  
power ;

power ; whose improvement and cultivation were to form your future fortune and happiness : all these colonies are now freed by this peace from every apprehension and danger with which a vigilant active enterprizing and powerful rival could threaten them ; and all his possessions, that could raise any jealousy or do any hurt, are now become yours.—If the improvement of your colonies before these acquisitions was of so great importance ; how infinitely is their value increased at this time, when every obstruction is removed, and scenes of improvement are laid open that the warmest imagination could not have hoped for ?—Yet even this is not all : for by this peace an additional source of riches and security is thrown into your scale, by bounding and terminating your immense possessions with the acquisition of Florida ; an acquisition which, abstracted from the consideration of its favourable climate and the extent of the territory itself, furnishes you with a situation of  
all

all others, next to the Havanah, the most desirable to check the pride of Spain, and render her supplies of treasure in the time of war ineffectual. In a word, America was the object of the war; the sentiments of the nation before the war, and during the war, were fixed upon America only, preferably to every other object; Mr P conformed his views to these sentiments in his discussions of the peace; and the king's servants in concluding it, adhered invariably to them, and improved upon those discussions.—Yet even this is not all: for by this peace, the valuable sugar islands of St Vincent, Dominica, Tobago, the Grenades and Grenadines, are ceded and added to your dominion; which afford not only a fair and sure prospect of enlarging this branch of trade, but of augmenting and enhancing the trade of North America itself: and the cession of Senegal and its dependencies greatly heightens and extends your African commerce. I conclude therefore, that as the war was begun



gun and carried on in conformity to the true and real spirit and sentiment of the nation ; the peace was likewise framed conformably to the same spirit and sentiment : that the end and motive of the war was fully accomplished : and in regard to the dominion acquired by it, considering its nature, the improvement and immediate increase it gives to national trade, and the future but certain glorious prospect of riches and power to be necessarily derived from it, it is clearly and truly a peace not only of acquisition, but of security and full indemnification ; and consequently an honourable, adequate and advantageous peace.

THE objections to this peace, in all their force, are these.

THE distracted and ruined condition of France, beaten out of the East and almost intirely out of the West Indies, without a fleet, without a treasury, a bankrupt people, and a government without credit;  
all

all this taken along with the prosperous and triumphant condition of Great Britain, and the important acquisitions she had made from the year 1761 that the negociation, was broke off by Mr P, to the year 1762 that the conferences were renewed by Lord B: gave a fair and advantageous opportunity, on the recommencement of these conferences, for weakening and humbling France as a maritime power, and for raising and aggrandising the importance of Great Britain in this respect, so as to render the former incapable hereafter to hurt, and the latter for the future perfectly secure. That the enormous debt of the nation necessarily incurred by the war, and solely occasioned by the bad faith and rapacious spirit of France, called aloud for indemnification and reimbursement. That both the one and the other of these were to have been obtained by excluding intirely the French from the fish trade of Newfoundland and the gulph of St. Laurence, and by

E

at

at least keeping possession of the rich and precious island of Guadaloup in the West Indies, and both the settlements of Gorce and Senegal on the coast of Africa. These would have been to us an immediate source of riches and strength, by giving the most extensive scope to trade, augmenting our shipping, and establishing an inexhaustable nursery of seamen, the only true and solid strength of the nation. The interest of North America itself required this, as Guadaloup would have been a great and additional market for their lumber and provisions; and the prosperity and advantages thereby mutually arising to both, would in the result have highly advanced the interest and prosperity of Britain. That it would have been infinitely more eligible, rather than have failed in this point, to have admitted the French again into a part of their former possessions in North America, and given them the barren soil of Canada to work upon: for the advantages arising there,  
are

are at a very remote period, not to say very uncertain; but those proceeding from the possession of the sugar islands are immediate and of the most substantial kind, and what the debt of the nation stands in the most immediate and real need of. But in place of all this, to reinstate the French in the fishery, the African and sugar trade; is to restore to them all the certain sources of that naval power by which they have been already so very formidable, and will again be enabled very soon to give scope to their insatiable ambition by a renewal of the war. When added to all this it is taken into view, that they are restored intirely to all their former trade in the East Indies; that the interest of our heroic and magnanimous ally, the King of Prussia, was deserted from the beginning to the end of the treaty; and that out of all our important conquests in the West Indies, only the worst of the neutral islands with the insignificant islands of the Grenades and Grenadines

were shared out to us, whilst St Lucia and its excellent port were given up to the French: we may venture to conclude, notwithstanding all the additional conquests we made in the interval of the discussions of peace, that the definitive treaty, with all those advantages said to be on its side, has concluded a much worse peace than what Mr P planned, even when he was as to Germany under many and great difficulties, and as to the West Indies unprovided with the conquests of Martinico and the Havana; and that upon the whole the peace is inadequate to our conquests, dishonourable disadvantageous and insecure.

Most unquestionably true it is, that to have excluded the French wholly from the fish trade in North America, to have retained in our own hands Guadaloup Senegal and Goree, would have been highly advantageous to the commercial interest of Great Britain.

But

But why stop here? Would it not have been immensely more advantageous, to have retained all our conquests, to have kept possession of Martinico the Havana and all the neutral islands, and to have excluded the French forever from the East Indies? Undoubtedly it would. When you have once passed the line of moderation and justice, there is nothing afterwards to stop your career. All this, both in the one and the other case, is the spirit of violence dominion and conquest. It is the spirit of a Gengizchan, a Tamerlane, a Louisquatorze, who despoiled the earth, and wasted the race of men, for their own private emolument and glory; who terminated the limits of right by the sword, and measured the boundaries of justice by the extent of their power. We are a people and nation of a very different complexion and character. We have the peculiar and sacred privilege of being free. This very freedom inspires, or ought to inspire us, with the highest justice

justice and moderation. Shall we who have been calling upon heaven and earth for almost a century past to save Europe from the universal dominion of France; we who have expended so many thousands of men, and so many millions of money, insomuch that we have enrich'd the continent with our negociations and subsidies, to no other purpose than to promote and establish the liberties of Europe, and to keep the despotic powers of the earth within a state of mediocrity and justice: shall we, the very first moment that providence has put it in our election to manifest to the world what spirit we really are of, give the lie to all our most solemn professions, to all our most generous disinterested and heroic exploits; and display to mankind a spirit as licentious unbounded and ambitious as that of France, against which at different times we have associated with all Europe in order to depress it, and bring it back to the standard of equity and humanity? Is  
not

not this most publicly and incontestably to declare, that our ambition is as strong, our desire of dominion as large and unmeasurable, as his was whom we have opposed; that our views and our objects of pursuit were the same with his; and that we obstructed him not as an enemy, but as a rival, being now determined to controul the world ourselves? —The truth of this reasoning will be fully illustrated by having recourse to the principle we set out upon.

For this purpose let us reverse the scene, and imagine ourselves in the place of the enemy at the time of settling the conditions of peace. Let us suppose that we had incroached upon the settlements of the French, and that in the course of the war raised upon this account, the most Christian king had succeeded in his enterprises against our settlements in North America, taken all our islands in the West Indies but one, expelled us from the East Indies and  
the



the coast of Africa; and that we had been so unlucky as to take from him only one island of no importance in point of commerce, but valuable for its situation in time of war, and an excellent place of arms, especially for that branch which respects the marine, and on this account was of considerable importance to the enemy. This description will answer to our island of Minorca. That besides this, we had got possession of some places and territories belonging to the enemy's allies, and had a kingdom belonging to his most close and intimate ally at our discretion, and ready to be over-run and conquered in case we should be put to the last extremity. This account will directly co-inceed with the situation of Hanover Hefs and Brunswick, and the kingdom of Portugal. Under these circumstances we represent to the enemy, that it is impossible to settle the point of offence that gives just rise to wars between great sovereigns. Their ideas and conceptions of titles

titles rights limits and possessions are so divided and opposite the one to the other, and the reasons of state and public utility so mix and blend themselves in the sentiments and opinions of each court, that it is impossible they should ever agree in this point. Much more so in the present case, where the territory claimed by the one sovereign as his right by charters, was the very same with that claimed by the other as his right by occupation and possession in the fullest and amplest manner for a long series of years, and deriving an additional strength from being unquestioned in several treaties, mutually confirming and guarantying one another's possessions. That in consequence of this, some such misunderstanding must have arose from the conduct of one or other of the parties at some time or other, had not the present quarrel existed. That this point being duly considered, it ought to remove every idea of premeditated and determined malevolence in one sovereign

F                      towards

towards the other, and introduce that equitable spirit of moderation and humanity which pays the highest regard to the general interests of men, that by which all civilized nations are so much governed, and which the circumstances of Europe so much require, as to make it an essential part of that law which ought to direct the conduct of nations. That upon this principle we not only would give up the limits contended for, which were the occasion of the war: but to prevent all future misunderstanding, and as a compensation and indemnification of the injury alledged to be done, and the trouble and expence incurred by the war, we would cede and guaranty to him forever, not only Canada, but all that part of Louisiana lying on the left side of the Mississippi, and all the adjoining regions and countries, with all their dependencies. That the object of the war being thus obtained and satisfaction made, we expected that the liberty of fishing on the banks of Newfoundland

foundland should be confirmed to us as heretofore; it being a subject altogether distinct from the war, and deriving its source from the treaty of Utrecht. And for this purpose that an island should be restored to us for the shelter and security of our vessels in that trade, but which should never be fortified in any manner whatever, and consequently could give no umbrage or create any jealousy. That in lieu of the Havana, he should have all the territory of Florida and the Mobile; which would not only greatly extend but highly improve his dominions, and give them a form and boundary the least liable to all exceptions for the future. That to enrich him still more, he should have three out of four of the neutral sugar islands; and the Grenades and Grenadines, improved and flourishing islands of our own, in lieu of the fourth. And as to all other advantages and conquests on the one side and the other, as they were the consequences of the war,

not causes of it, they ought only to be considered as the means on both sides for obtaining peace: wherefore out of regard to the general interest of Europe, and to put a stop to the further effusion of human blood, and to restore the blessings of peace to the world, they should be mutually given up on both sides; except that Senegal should remain an acquisition to the enemy, and that we should be obliged to erect no fortifications, or keep any troops, in any of our settlements in Bengal.

HAD we, in the distressed condition of France, made all these large and valuable concessions to him; and by subjecting ourselves to keep many of our settlements defenceless and unprotected by fortifications and troops, in so far sacrificed our security as well as our interest for the sake of obtaining peace: and had he merciless and unrelenting, buoyed up with his success, and planning in the height of his imperious pride our utter destruction;  
still

still persisted to afflict us with a continuance of the war, unless we would even annihilate our hopes of being ever any more a naval power, and of being ever any more able to employ and enrich our people, by giving up our claims to the fishery, and ceding forever one or more of our principal sugar islands: had he done all this, what would our sentiments and conduct have been? Let every man fairly and thoroughly realize this picture in his own mind, then lay his hand on his heart, and speak what passes there.

COULD the most distinguished afflictions of a nation move compassion; the public distress of the state, the universal Bankruptcy of our people, the want of credit with foreign nations and the inability of our nobles and clergy, tho' stripped even of their public and private plate, to bring any sufficient relief, had long ere this excited the commiseration and softened into compliance the resentment of a generous enemy. Could the  
most

most exorbitant and enormous cessions have gratified his lucrative and ambitious views; the cessions we have tendered had more than gorged him. But the most just and ample satisfaction for the injury that occasioned the war; the most extensive important and liberal indemnification and security for all the expence and consequences of it; the extent of many kingdoms given up, the sure and infallible sources of trade riches power dominion and empire; even the best and most important of our settlements on the coast of Africa thrown into the scale; these, even all these, are still insufficient to satiate his implacable and cruel rage, inflated as he is with victory, and imperious in conquest. The contest therefore appears no longer to be about an injury done or received, about the limits of Nova Scotia and our incroachments upon one another's territory; but whether we shall be forever deleted from the roll of fame, and never mentioned more as a name of respect amongst  
the

the nations. Long had his open and concealed efforts at unbounded dominion and illimitable power been by us rendered abortive, long had Great Britain stood the shield and bulwark of Europe against all his oppressions. This is the real injury that rankles in his heart: and convinced that he cannot succeed, whilst we are in a condition to resist him; he is determined on improving the present favourable opportunity of his victories, to accomplish our utter destruction. And shall we, forgetful of what we are and what we have been; shall we a brave and free people, unmindful of our pristine fame and unfulfilled glory, submit our necks to the yoke, and become the tame slaves of haughty insolence and arrogant injustice? No, let us rather perish as we have lived, free and undaunted: and leave to the world a fair and genuine proof of the true and excellent spirit of our constitution, by choosing rather not to exist at all, than to exist without honour, without dignity,



ty, without the influence of Laws, and without being free from the arbitrary controul and oppression of a conqueror. Heaven and earth will approve of so virtuous so magnanimous and truly glorious a resolution; heaven and earth will assist us in the arduous conflict. Our resources are still great; let every one in his station exert himself to the utmost, and animate his neighbour.—We have a generous and free people, and their courage yet unbroken, which the divine energy will convert into heroic ardour. Europe now sees the veil of moderation and justice thrown aside; and that Europe whom we have so often saved, will at length conspire our deliverance from the adamantine hand of power, and the ruthless violence of universal dominion. Confident in so good a cause, let us instantly break off all treaty, bidding open and everlasting defiance to the enemy; and reposing our trust in the Almighty and our own active virtue, expect the event with inflexible fortitude. This  
greatest

greatest and highest consolation still remains, that by acting thus, should even the worst and most fatal catastrophe attend our affairs, we shall fall approved of by ourselves, and admired and praised to endless ages, wherever true virtue liberty and glory are held in veneration upon earth.—Would not these, or such as these, have been our sentiments ; this, or such as this, our conduct ? With perfect security I dare make the appeal to every man worthy of the name of Briton, and rest assured of his suffrage.—But should the timid prudence of the state have got the better of the bold and daring spirit of the constitution, and a peace been accepted upon such dishonourable and destructive terms, would it have been a peace that in the nature of things could have kept together : Or rather would it not have been made use of to strengthen and repair the injuries and losses we had sustained, and to enable us, as soon as it was practicable, to break asunder our fetters, and commit our high revenge to the decision of providence, and

G

the

ty, without the influence of Laws, and without being free from the arbitrary controul and oppression of a conqueror. Heaven and earth will approve of so virtuous so magnanimous and truly glorious a resolution; heaven and earth will assist us in the arduous conflict. Our resources are still great; let every one in his station exert himself to the utmost, and animate his neighbour.—We have a generous and free people, and their courage yet unbroken, which the divine energy will convert into heroic ardour. Europe now sees the veil of moderation and justice thrown aside; and that Europe whom we have so often saved, will at length conspire our deliverance from the adamantine hand of power, and the ruthless violence of universal dominion. Confident in so good a cause, let us instantly break off all treaty, bidding open and everlasting defiance to the enemy; and reposing our trust in the Almighty and our own active virtue, expect the event with inflexible fortitude. This  
greatest

the horrors and desolation of a future war? Unquestionably this would have been the case; or we must have lost our freedom and importance as a nation for ever.

LET us return to the true state of our affairs, nor hesitate with truth to acknowledge, that having put ourselves in the enemy's place, and being thereby sensible of the insupportable injury and injustice that would have been done to us by imposing upon us severer conditions than those equitable advantageous and even liberal concessions we had been willing in that situation to make; it would in our own turn have been likewise unjust, as well as impolitic and destructive of the future repose and tranquillity of Europe, for us to have insisted upon advantages and acquisitions, which rather than submit to, France was determined to suffer every calamity and run every risk that the precarious situation of his affairs could present to him. The principle of honour  
and

and glory in France, operates nearly what the principle of virtue and liberty does in Great Britain. The honour of the nation, the dignity of the prince, and the universal attachment of the people to both these objects, can nearly effect what with us is accomplished by our constitution and laws, and the strong and manly affections of our people to that freedom and independency which they produce. France is capable of the greatest firmness, and the spirit of the discerning and judicious Montesquieu may be said to be the spirit of all the French nobility, where alluding to Louis Quatorze and the distressed circumstances he was reduced to by the victorious arms of Great Britain and her allies, he says, " I know nothing so magnanimous as the resolution taken by a monarch who reigned in the present age, to bury himself under the ruins of the throne, rather than accept of propositions which a king ought not to understand : He had a soul too haughty to descend lower than his misfortunes

“ had placed him ; and he well knew,  
 “ that courage might establish a crown,  
 “ but that infamy never could.” \* Let  
 us do public as well as private justice.  
 The spirit of Louis Quatorze reigns still  
 in the court of France, with this favourable  
 circumstance on their side, that the  
 real strength and spirit of the nation,  
 in men and arms, was infinitely less  
 broken and exhausted at the conclusion  
 of the last war, than in that which pro-  
 duced the treaty of Utrecht. Neither the  
 courage nor force of France were over-  
 matched in the last war by that of Great  
 Britain ; but in the conduct and ability of  
 her

---

\* Je ne sçache rien de si magnanime, que la re-  
 solution que prit un Monarque qui a régné de nos  
 Jours, de s'enfvelir plutôt sous les débris du Trône,  
 que d'accepter des propositions qu'un roi ne doit pas  
 entendre : Il avoit l'ame trop fiere, pour descendre  
 plus bas que ses malheurs ne l'avoient mis ; et il sçavoit  
 bien que le courage peut raffermir un couronne, et  
 que l'infamie ne le fait jamais. *Grandeur et Deca-*  
*dence des Romains, Chap. 5.*

her commanders by sea and land, Great Britain did indeed superlatively excell.

HAVING by the application of this universal principle of right and wrong to the case in hand, explained the insufficiency weakness and injustice of the arguments brought against the peace; it will be proper now to examine these arguments more particularly, viz. as they have respect to the interest of Great Britain, and to the merits of the two several negotiations carried on in the years 1761 and 1762.

THE acquisitions which we had made in the interval between the negotiation of 1761 and 1762, gave an opportunity it is said of humbling France, and aggrandizing Great Britain; the enormous national debt contracted in the war, required reimbursement: And both the one and the other of these might have been effected, by excluding the French from the fish trade, and by keeping possession of Guadaloupe Senegal and Goree.

As

As France could not be brought to these terms, it was necessary in order to have effected this purpose, that we should have broken off this second negotiation, and committed our hope to the contingent success of our arms in the future prosecution of the war. To have carried on the war, our national debt must have annually increased at least between ten and twelve millions. Our manufactures and our tillage complained loudly at that time for want of hands. Our army and navy were nearly deficient one half of their complement of men. The extent of our conquests, as well as the fresh expeditions to be undertaken, would have required a large augmentation of our forces. And, additional to all this, the annual loss of men in the course of the war, and by malignant climates, must have been constantly supplied to secure our conquests, as well as to annoy the enemy. Under these circumstances and having this fair view of the case before us; was it for the interest



terest of the nation to contract a debt more than the value of the subject to be contended for, and at a time when oppressed by the unwieldy and exorbitant debt already contracted? Was it her interest to have her manufactures and her navigation at a stand for want of hands, when her trade called for them most; and when she most stood in need of that trade, to enable her to support the past burthens of the war? Was it for her interest to bleed on and diminish her strength, already too much exhausted, by the fresh supplies of men requisite to fill up the wasted ranks of her armies and the thin mustered complements of her fleets, at a time when to cultivate and improve her American dominions more supplies were wanted than she could of herself have afforded in her most abundant and prolifick state? To speak in great moderation, it required I apprehend at least 30,000 men to compleat her forces by sea and land. The further extention of the war would have required an augmentation of our forces to at least

10 or 15,000 men, in order to make and secure future conquests; or even to keep the kingdom of Portugal from being entirely vanquished: And to recruit and keep up all this force, it would have been necessary to have furnished the annual supplies of at least 15 or 20,000 men more. Was it for the interest of Great Britain to have done all this? Or, rather in attempting to do it, must not our manufactures, our tillage, our trade been inevitably diminished and in a great measure ruined and lost? Would we not, indeed, by such a conduct, have lost the substance in pursuit of the shadow?—These are self-evident facts which carry their own authority with them to whosoever will condescend dispassionately to weigh them: And this must have turned out to be the ruinous situation of our affairs, even supposing our prosperous fortunes had continued to attend us in our future expeditions and conquests.

BUT

BUT what a dismal scene of adversity must this conduct have produced, had that kind disposing providence which had so liberally hitherto gratified our most ardent wishes, become at length weary of our insatiable pursuits after glory ; and, shifting to the enemy's side, checked our immoderate ambition ? For we owed much to this providence, otherwise and most fashionably stiled fortune fate and chance. Not to mention the Royal Hero of Prussia, who was an unparalelled miracle of its favour from the beginning to the end of the war ; whoever hath been himself an actor, or whoever has had an opportunity of being acquainted with the nice and critical movements upon which the fate of our several expeditions and campaigns turned, must be a thorough infidel indeed, not to acknowledge, after doing the highest justice to the merit of the respective commanders, and to the courage and intrepidity of the troops, that Heaven in a remarkable manner ordered every thing to our purpose, and gave the finishing eclat

H to

to all our exploits. He will remember, in 1757, the kind protecting hand of providence, first in clearing up the face of day, when that tremendous storm encompassed our fleet, which would have otherwise overwhelmed it in inevitable destruction on the coast of Louisbourg; and then in infatuating the enemy to neglect the favourable opportunity of attacking our disabled and dispersed fleet with their formidable squadron, that had been shielded by their port, and uninjured by the tempest; thereby saving us a second time from perdition, and the nation from the loss of twenty line-of-battle ships, which at that time would have given France a clear superiority at sea. He will remember in 1758, at the landing made at Louisbourg, when the roughness of the sea, the ruggedness of the shore, and the enemy's impregnable lines, threatened rout and ruin upon that expedition, how the same celestial interposition struck the enemy with a pannick, and rendered our attack victorious. He will remember in  
1759,

1759, when by the capacity and vigilance of the enemy our intrepid general was reduced to the last scene of despair before Quebec, how the same over-ruling providence conveyed us by the enemy's post at Sillery, undiscovered. tho' challenged by the centries as our boats pass'd along to the attack ; and, having sealed with a profound sleep the eyes of the guard who defended the hill, kept by this circumstance the debarkation of our men from being perceived, rendered the attack of the hill itself practicable, and brought our little handful of troops upon the plains of Abraham, which produced the memorable battle of Quebec. He will remember the same providential care in the unforeseen and undesigned tho' opportune and salutary moment of the capitulation of Guadaloupe, when the very instant after it was concluded, succours arrived to the assistance of the island, more than sufficient to have blasted our hopes and ruined our enterprize. He will remember in 1760 the same divine power giving suc-

cess to the amazing and not to be expected footing that our troops made good on the impregnable rock of Belle-isle. He will recollect the tremours, the panicks, the fugitive retreats of the enemy in 1762, from the impenetrable posts of Morne-Tortonson and Morne-Garnier in Martinico; the unnecessary unaccountable flight of Monf La Touche, the governor, from Fort Royal; the surrender of that fort, uninjured in its works and in the vigour of its defence; as well as Monf La Touche's surrender of the capital St Pierre, before the semblance of danger appeared: and acknowledge the same providential influence as confounding the judgment, and unnerving the heart, of the devoted enemy. These are a few instances; for to repeat all, would be to run over the transactions of the war. And had this divine and over-ruling impulse at length taken part with the enemy, and exerted its energy in frustrating our pursuits after conquest; how soon would our fresh blooming laurels have withered!

and

and our splendid victories and conquests become the gaudy grave of our high fame and warlike reputation !

ABSTRACTED from whatever might have been the decrees of fate, it is not at all difficult to account, agreeably to the common current of human affairs, how in the further prosecution of the war, adversity might have succeeded to the happy fortunes we had hitherto experienced. The spirit of party and cabal had already taken hold of the nation, that Dæmon spirit which divides distracts and animates a people to mutual jealousies and injuries against one another ; which first foretells public calamities and distress, and then exerts her utmost efforts to bring about the perfect accomplishment of her malevolent wishes. What this spirit would have effected in the prosecution of the war, may with a degree of certainty be inferred from what in part it did effect at the close of the war. Towards the close of the war, every accident was aggravated

vated into a crime: and at a time when the government was exerting its highest efforts against the enemy, it was given out, that the ministry wished for disgrace and infamy to our arms. Witness the French landing upon Newfoundland in the first place, and the attack and siege of the Havana in the second. Every thing was attempted, to throw us back into the barbarity of the last century. The age of science and refinement has been polluted with the rudeness scurrility and abuse of the most illiterate and brutal times. Local distinctions which have now no real existence, have been revived; one part of the nation has been insulted, as it were, by the other; one part declared alien to the other; Englishman and Scotchman have been terms bandied about only to inspire haughtiness and contempt on one side, jealousy and indignation on the other. Thus hath Great Britain been attempted to be torn to pieces, in order to rouse her sons to mortal feuds, and steel their breasts with implacable hatred towards one another.

To



To have continued the war under these circumstances, cool recollection will acknowledge, would have been to have betrayed the nation and all its glory and interest to the enemy. In our armies and navies, amongst our officers and men, under this infernal spirit of animosity ; mutual resentments, mutual injuries, mutual aims and desires of frustrating one another's fame and success, would have most effectually subdued us, and given him his turn of triumph. Along with these discordant humours that had in part infected the people, and which have been since carried still further ; let us consider the violent internal convulsions that might naturally have happened all over the kingdom, from the stagnation that would have necessarily been occasioned in our manufactures, our trade, our agriculture, by the taking off of such vast numbers of men to serve in the war : and how much all this must have affected the public revenue, as well as the private circumstances of every individual in the nation : and how

how soon misery and want, headed by faction and party rage, would have swelled into insurrection and rebellion. In the last place let us observe, in what light we should then have appeared to the rest of the powers of Europe. How from the motives of the war being conceived by them to be most amply recompenced by the concessions the enemy had offered, they might have regarded the protraction of it on our part, as proceeding from an exorbitant desire of naval power and dominion. How expedient they might have thought it to declare themselves averse to a state becoming absolute by sea, as well from the general ill consequences threatening the whole by the ballance being broken, and an undue share of power thrown into any one scale, as by the danger which they might have thought threatned the particular interest of every one of them who had already established or were about to establish a system of commerce. How France might have worked upon these jealousies and fears  
already

already formed and prepared to his hand, and by that means have brought about a general alliance against us for endeavouring at universal dominion by sea, as important and formidable as ever we collected against him for attempting the same by land. This is not a rash and chimerical imagination. Let us consider how strongly attached the Swedes and the Dutch were to the court of France; and under the present appearance of things, how much their interest as well as inclination might have led them to turn this attachment into the strictest confederacy and union. How practicable it might have been, in this general alarm of danger diffused over Europe, for this grand confederacy, aided by all the influence power and interest of the empire the court of Spain and the pope, to have constrained by terror, as well as induced by allurements of interest, the republic of Venice to join her force with theirs. In that case this republic could have furnished twenty line-of-battle ships of eighty guns each, to the combined

I

bined squadron. This taken along with the united efforts of France Spain Sweden and Holland, would, I humbly conceive, have produced a naval force sufficient to dispute the dominion of the seas with Great Britain in the meridian of her strength, and much more than sufficient at this time, exhausted as she was by the unparalleled efforts of a long and bloody war. But should an over-weening indulgence to our own merit, think all this not enough; sure this taken along with our internal weakness, the malevolence of our parties, the tumults distractions and violence of our people already described, would have been more than sufficient to have covered us with the most dreadful calamities.

It is objected, that rather than have parted with Guadaloupe, it would have been infinitely more eligible to have admitted the French again into a part of their former possessions in North America, and given them the barren soil of Canada to work upon.

THERE

THERE is nothing so absurd but what may be admitted as most evidently right and true, after the minds of men are properly prepared to receive it. Impress once upon the people the idea of incapacity in the government, and a suspicion and jealousy of its intentions; and then the wisest and best measures will appear imprudent and hurtful. But can we so forget the hair-breadth escapes we have already had, from the French having been settled in America; and the immense efforts it required, and the prodigious public debt it has involved us in, to drive them out of it: that we should now so easily and readily barter their return, for the acquisition of a sugar island? Would this island, however magnified in its produce and importance, for greatly magnified it has been; \* answer to the hazard we

I 2                      should

---

\* The value of Guadaloupe has been estimated by the imports made from thence of sugars during the time we possessed it. But no account has been made  
of

should run of being soon engaged in a fresh quarrel, by the French and We prosecuting our different and opposite interests on that continent? And is all our past experience still insufficient to convince us of the impossibility that we should ever agree in that quarter of the world; having both the same views, and both contending there for superiority of dominion, as well as advancement of trade? We have already found since the peace, how difficult it is from the nature of the country, and the enemy we have to deal with, to subdue the Indians to measures of peace and accommodation, unsupported and uninfluenced by any thing but their own irregular and savage tempers.

---

of the prodigious quantity of sugars that were run from Martinico into Guadaloupe during all that time, as being the readiest and only safe market the French could have, until the time that we took Martinico itself, which was in the close of the war. So that the value of both islands have by this means been estimated, as the value of only one of them.

temper. Had the French, agreeably to what is contained in the objection, been again put in possession of Canada, it must have been infinitely more difficult, or rather absolutely impracticable for us, to have reduced the Indians to any terms; whilst supported, united and supplied, as they would have been in every thing, by all the power the art and industry of our rival. Nay, this very step, now pleaded as a wiser and better measure than what we have taken, had it been followed, would have been arraigned, and upon the clearest evidence condemned, as a betraying the interest of the nation, sacrificing the end for which the war was undertaken, and giving away every true and real advantage obtained by our victories and the expence of so much blood and treasure. This spirit of opposition would then indeed have contended, and with great propriety, that our peace had brought us no security: for such a peace as they now recommend, would have sown the seeds of eternal war and distress  
in

in North America. The Indian war would have been directed to harass intimidate and destroy our settlements. These settlements, apt enough in their own nature to be turbulent and uneasy under the restraints and limitations put upon them by the mother-country ; would have had that turbulence inflamed by the emissaries of our rival : And when at any time they had carried their resentment and disrespect towards the British legislature and government so far, as to dread her correction and chastisement ; the arms of France would have been ready to support them in open defection and rebellion. Watching such opportunities, prepared to improve them, it is not difficult to conceive the fatal consequences in future times, not to our security only, but to the existence of our dominion in that continent, arising from the power of France, reinforced by the Indians, and strengthened by the defection of our own colonies.—As to the advantages that would have arisen from the possession of Guadaloupe, in furnishing  
an



an additional market for the lumber and provisions of North America ; these advantages will be still open. The French West-India settlements stand in need of those articles. Their interests compel them to apply to North America for them ; and the British legislature will certainly encourage that trade, as far as it is consistent with the general interest. But it appears at present to be a clear and uncontrovertible truth, that unless some provision can be made for lowering the duties arising from our sugar islands, so as to put them upon some equality with the French sugar islands ; the furnishing of lumber and provisions to the latter, must necessarily put them in a capacity of underselling the former at a foreign market, and consequently in a course of time, of ruining this important article of our commerce. The double object therefore in view, is to encourage and enlarge as far as possible the North American trade, and at the same time to put our sugar islands upon such an equitable footing, as to enable

enable them to vend their produce at a foreign market at least as cheap, according to its quality, as the French. And unless the fretful partial and selfish spirit of party intervene, there is no doubt but that both these objects will be adjusted, upon the best and wisest principles, in the present session of parliament.

It has been asserted, that the advantages arising from our acquisitions in North America are very remote, not to say very uncertain; whereas those proceeding from the possession of the sugar islands are immediate, and of the most substantial kind.

HAD our ancestors argued in this manner, and acted agreeably to this reasoning; North America had certainly never received colonies from Great Britain: for the prospect of success was infinitely less certain at the time of their emigration, than the advantages to be derived from our new acquisitions are to us now. But  
to

to argue from fact and experience.—I would beg leave to observe, that as our colonies have arrived at their present prosperous state in less than a century, by the mere force of nature, and their own industry, and notwithstanding the numberless obstructions they have met with from the Indians and French, and the almost total neglect of the British government till very lately; it is self-evident, that all these obstructions being removed, by the Indians becoming our friends, the French being expelled, and the legislature of Great Britain taking these colonies immediately under its care, and promoting and encouraging the plantation of our new acquisitions: they must continue to grow in numbers riches and commerce, in a much higher and greater proportion than at any given time before; and of consequence, the emolument and benefit resulting thence to Great Britain, must be in a much higher and greater degree than in any former period. The advantages therefore arising from our acquisitions

K

in

in North America, are neither remote nor uncertain, but immediate and sure. And as they are of a progressive nature, and will continue to augment and enlarge themselves with time; they are for that very reason of the higher importance, and give a more fixed and durable prospect of the dominion power and felicity of Great Britain. For as states and empires, like individual mortals, grow up to a certain height, and then decline; so that empire which is still growing and flourishing, but at the same time the longest in arriving at the meridian of its greatness, bids fairest, in the course of nature, for duration and happiness.—In this respect the empire of America may be said to be the renovation of youth to the kingdom of Great Britain; already, when considered by herself, in an advanced age. I am infinitely far from undervaluing Guadaloupe; but when brought in competition with so grand an object as this, it becomes unworthy of being held in the least degree of comparison. Here then

then is a fund infinitely more large, more rich, and durable than Guadaloupe; and from these newly acquired possessions, and all the extensive channels of commerce they lay open, being properly improved and duely attended to, we are to expect not only the means, along with our other resources, of discharging the present public debt; but of being in a capacity of contracting upon occasion a much larger one, and of supporting with vigour a much longer war. And although the French are permitted to exercise their former trade of the fishery near Newfoundland, and in some tracts of the gulph of St. Laurencè; yet, with every advantage on our side, it must be our fault alone, if ever they rival us in that branch of commerce.

I BEG leave then most humbly to conclude upon this head, that it was not the interest of Great Britain to continue the war: that as we could not exclude the French from the fish trade, and keep pos-

cession of Guadaloupe Senegal and Gorree, without continuing the war ; it was directly and immediately the advantage and interest of Great Britain to conclude peace upon the honourable advantageous and enlarged terms the enemy agreed to : and that to have exchanged Canada, or any part of the enemy's former dominion in North America, for Guadaloupe ; would have been most essentially hurtful and injurious to the nation, in its dearest and greatest interest.

It remains, that we consider the merits of the two several negotiations, carried on in the respective years of 1761 and 1762.

THE negotiation of 1761 had, on our side, two grand and principle objects in view. The first respected the interests of Great Britain in general, and as such had the most direct and immediate relation to the motives and causes that gave rise to the war. On which account " the intire  
" and

“ and total cession of all Canada and its  
 “ dependencies; and of the island of  
 “ Cape Breton, and of the other islands  
 “ in the gulph and river of St Lau-  
 “ rence, ” were invariably and inflexibly  
 insisted upon. The second respected the  
 most honourable and perfect accomplish-  
 ment of our engagements with the King  
 of Prussia, and with this view it was de-  
 clared, “ That in case the seperate peace  
 “ between the two crowns should be con-  
 “ cluded, His Majesty would continue,  
 “ as an auxiliary, faithfully to assist the  
 “ King of Prussia, with efficacy and good  
 “ faith, in order to accomplish the salutary  
 “ purpose of a general pacification in  
 “ Germany; and that it should be free  
 “ to Great Britain and France, to support,  
 “ as auxiliaries, their respective allies in  
 “ their particular contests for the recovery  
 “ of Silesia, pursuant to the respective  
 engage-

---

\* *Vid.* The Answer of the British Court to the  
 Ultimatum of the Court of France received the  
 1st of September 1761. Art. 1st.

“ engagements which those two crowns  
 “ have entered into. ”

THE court of France complied with the first of these objects, but insisted on the liberty of fishing and drying fish on the banks of Newfoundland, agreeably to the 13th article of the treaty of Utrecht; and on the liberty of fishing in all parts of the gulph of St Laurence, without landing on the coasts, unless in case of accidents; and on the cession of the islands St Pierre and Michelon for the accommodation of the French fishery, and for shelter to their fishing vessels; stipulating at the same time, that there should be no military establishment, only a guard of 50 men to enforce the police: that no foreign vessels should land at those islands; and that an English commissary should be resident in the said island, to be witness to the

---

<sup>b</sup> *Vid.* The Answer of the British Court to the Memorial of French Propositions, 29th July, 1761, Art. 13th.



the punctuality with which the stipulated condition of the treaty should be observed<sup>c</sup>. The British court in her answer to the Ultimatum of France, had confined herself only to the cession of St Pierre; and had stipulated not only for the residence of an English commissary, but that the commander of the British squadron at Newfoundland should have a right from time to time to inspect the said isle and port. Here the two courts, as far as related to the island Michelon and the inspection of the British commander, differed to the last.

WITH regard to the secondary objects of their negotiation, the British court insisted, that “ the town and port of Dunkirk should be put in the condition it ought to have been in by the last treaty of Aix la Chapelle<sup>d</sup>”. And the court  
of

---

<sup>c</sup> *Vid.* The last Memorial of France to England, 9th September 1761. Art. 4th.

<sup>d</sup> *Vid.* The Answer of the British Court to the Ultimatum of the Court of France, received the 1st of Sept. 1761.

of France agreed to “ demolish the works  
 “ that had been made there for the de-  
 “ fence of the port since the beginning  
 “ of the war, to fill up the bason which  
 “ contains the ships of war, and to destroy  
 “ the buildings belonging to the rope  
 “ yard; but that the trading port, which  
 “ would not receive a frigate, should sub-  
 “ sist for the good of England as well as  
 “ for the benefit of France. That she  
 “ would undertake not to suffer any ma-  
 “ ritime military establishment in that  
 “ port; but that the cunette should be  
 “ left standing round the place for the sa-  
 “ lubrity of the air and the health of the  
 “ inhabitants. °”—France was willing to  
 evacuate the countries belonging to the  
 Landgrave of Hesse, the Duke of Brunf-  
 wick and the electorate of Hanover: “  
 And to restore to Great Britain the island  
 of

---

° *Vid.* The last Memorial of France to England,  
 9th Sept. 1761. Art. 4th.

† *Vid.* Ditto Art. 8. referring to the 7th Art. of  
 the French Ultimatum.

“ of Minorca, as likewise St Philip, in the  
 “ condition it stood, and with the artillery  
 “ therein, &c. at the time of taking the  
 “ said island and fort. ”—The British  
 court consented to restore to France “ the  
 “ islands Belle-isle Guadeloupe and Ma-  
 “ rigalante, with the artillery, &c. which  
 “ was therein at the time of taking the  
 “ said islands; ”<sup>a</sup> but insisted “ on an  
 “ equal partition of the neutral islands  
 “ Tobago St Lucia Dominica and St Vin-  
 “ cent, to be ascertained in the future treaty  
 “ between the two crowns. ”<sup>1</sup> And France  
 “ accepted of this partition, provided that  
 “ St Lucia was declared to make part of  
 “ the partition to be regulated in favour  
 “ of France. ”<sup>2</sup>—The British court in-  
 L fisted

---

<sup>a</sup> *Vid.* The last Memorial of France to England,  
 9th Sept. 1761. Art. 6th.

<sup>b</sup> *Vid.* The Answer of the British Court to the  
 Ultimatum of the Court of France, received the  
 1st of Sept. 1761. Art. 6th.

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* Ditto Art. 5th.

<sup>2</sup> *Vid.* The last Memorial of France to England,  
 &c. Art. 5th.

fisted on “ the cession of Senegal and its  
 “ dependencies as well as the island of  
 “ Goree in the most ample manner; but  
 “ declared, that if the court of France  
 “ would suggest any reasonable expedient  
 “ to provide themselves with negroes that  
 “ might not be too detrimental to the  
 “ British subjects in Africa, the King  
 “ would willingly enter upon a discussion  
 “ of this subject.<sup>1</sup>” And the French  
 court was “ willing to guaranty the pos-  
 “ session of Senegal and Goree to England,  
 “ provided England on her part would  
 “ guaranty the possession of the settle-  
 “ ments of Anamaboo and Akra on the  
 “ coast of Africa.<sup>m</sup>”—As to the East In-  
 dies, the court of England was of opinion,  
 that “ it must necessarily be left to the  
 “ companies of the two nations to adjust  
 “ the terms of accommodation and recon-  
 “ ciliation.

---

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* The Answer of the British Court to the Ultimatum of France, &c. Art 3d.

<sup>m</sup> *Vid.* The last Memorial of France to England, &c. Art 3d.

“ ciliation. ” And the court of France  
 “ adopted this negotiation between the  
 “ East India companies of the two nations,  
 “ on condition that the negotiation should  
 “ be concluded at the same time with that  
 “ between the two crowns. ” The ar-  
 ticles respecting the cession of hostilities  
 and the exchange of prisoners admitted  
 of no hesitation or doubt on either side.

So far the two crowns seemed to be  
 approaching towards one another's ideas  
 of peace as relative to themselves and re-  
 specting one another's dominions. There  
 was only one great point in which they  
 totally differed from beginning to end,  
 and that was with regard to the captures  
 made after the commencement of hosti-  
 lities and before the declaration of war.  
 The court of France insisted, that “ those

L 2

“ cap-

---

<sup>a</sup> *Vid.* The Answer of the British Court to the  
 Ultimatum of France, &c. Art. 13th.

<sup>o</sup> *Vid.* The last Memorial of France to England,  
 &c. Art. 13th.

“ captures, not including the King’s  
“ ships, were objects of legal restitu-  
“ tion.”” The court of England was  
of opinion, “ that such a demand, on  
“ the part of France, was neither just nor  
“ maintainable according to the most in-  
“ contestible principles of the right of  
“ war and of nations.”” France adhered  
to his demand of restitution; <sup>r</sup> and both  
Sovereigns remained inflexible on this  
point.

IN pursuance of the second grand ob-  
ject the British court insisted, that “ France  
“ should restore and evacuate Wesel and  
“ all the places and territories belonging  
“ to the King of Prussia in possession of  
the

---

<sup>p</sup> *Vid.* The French Memorial of the 15th July 1761, Art. 12th. And the French Ultimatum of the 5th of August 1761. Art. 10th.

<sup>q</sup> *Vid.* The Answer of the British Court to the Ultimatum of France, &c. Art. 10th.

<sup>r</sup> *Vid.* The last Memorial of France to England, &c. Art. 10th.

“ the arms of France: ” And that Ostend  
 “ and Newport should also be evacuated  
 “ without delay by the French garifons. ”  
 The court of France maintained, that  
 “ as to what concerned Wesel Guelders  
 “ and other countries in Westphalia be-  
 “ longing to the King of Prussia, which  
 “ were actually in possession of the Em-  
 “ press Queen, the King could not stipu-  
 “ late to surrender the conquests of his  
 “ allies: ” And as to “ Ostend and New-  
 “ port, he had only lent his forces to his  
 “ ally to secure those places, and that his  
 “ in-

---

\* *Vid.* The Answer of the British Court to the  
 Memorial of French Propositions, the 29th July  
 1761, being the Ultimatum of England, Art. 7th.  
 And the Answer of the British Court to the Ulti-  
 matum of France, Art. 8th.

\* *Vid.* Ditto Answer of the British Court to the  
 Memorial of French Propositions, &c. Art. 11th.  
 And Ditto Answer of the British Court to the Ulti-  
 matum of France, &c. Art. 11th.

\* *Vid.* The Ultimatum of France, the 5th of  
 Aug. 1761. Art. 7th. And the last Memorial of  
 France, &c. Art. 8th.

“intention never was to keep possession  
 “of them after the establishment of  
 “peace. \*”—Both Kings continued e-  
 qually intent upon the support of their  
 allies throughout the whole of the ne-  
 gotiation. France indeed proposed, that  
 “he would grant no succour of any kind  
 “to his allies for the continuance of the  
 “war against the King of Prussia, if His  
 “Britannick Majesty would enter into the  
 “like agreement with respect to that  
 “Monarch; and observed, that the pro-  
 “position of leaving France at liberty to  
 “send forces into Silesia, was unfavour-  
 “able, from particular circumstances, to  
 “the Empress, and consequently inad-  
 “missible. †” Great Britain replied with  
 energy, that “His Majesty remained in  
 “the same inflexible resolution which he  
 “de-

---

\* *Vid.* Ditto Ultimatum of France, &c. Art. 11th.  
 And ditto last Memorial of France, Art. 11th.

† *Vid.* Ditto Ultimatum of France, &c. Art. 13th.  
 And ditto last Memorial of France, &c. Art. 9th.



“ declared at the first overture of the  
 “ present negotiation, never to desist from  
 “ giving constant succour to the King of  
 “ Prussia, as an auxiliary, with efficacy  
 “ and good faith, in order to attain the  
 “ salutary end of a general pacification in  
 “ Germany. With this view His Ma-  
 “ jesty, far from proposing to leave France  
 “ at liberty to send armies into Silesia,  
 “ without being limited to the number  
 “ stipulated in her actual engagements  
 “ with the court of Vienna, (a circum-  
 “ stance not to be found in any part of  
 “ the Ultimatum of England) had uni-  
 “ formly declared, as the 13th article of  
 “ the said Ultimatum professes, that Great  
 “ Britain and France should be at liberty  
 “ to support their respective allies as auxi-  
 “ liaries in their particular contest for the  
 “ recovery of Silesia, according to the en-  
 “ gagements entered into by each crown.”

THE

---

\* *Vid.* Answer of the British Court to the Ulti-  
 matum of France, &c. Art. 9th.

THE interposition of the court of Spain, and the manner of that interposition in behalf of France, in the course of this negotiation, had not only disgusted the British court, but filled the British minister with the justest and best founded suspicions of the sincerity of France, and of her intentions of playing an after-game, by introducing Spain into a share of the war as her intimate confederate and ally; and these suspicions becoming more manifest and plain about the time that France emitted his last memorial, they put a final period to any further correspondence between the two courts. The Spanish war ensued, and all sides rested their hopes once more on the success of their arms.

MR P—'s conduct in all this business expressed the highest justice moderation and fortitude. He secured and indemnified Great Britain, as far as he could, by the acquisition of Canada, its dependencies, and the advantages attending the  
the

the dominion of the gulph and river of St. Laurence. He shewed a worthy and laudable moderation in the cessions that he made in favour of France. And it was not only fit, but indispensably necessary at that time, both for the honour of the nation and for the general interest of Europe, which was then staked upon the fate of Prussia, to manifest and prove to the world the most inflexible spirited and heroic attachment to his cause and interest. The King of Prussia was then in the most desperate situation, and the balance of Europe as well as the protestant interest was on the brink of ruin; so that if ever the continent merited our attention, it merited it now in the highest degree.

THE negociation of 1762 had, on our side, like that of the preceeding year, two grand and principal objects in view. The first was the same that had been pursued in the former conferences, and had respect to the interests of Great Britain as im-

M

mediately

mediately connected with the motives and causes of the war and other interests of an inferior degree. The other had relation to the King and kingdom of Portugal, who were both in the most imminent danger of being conquered and overrun by the united forces of France and Spain; and this intirely upon our account: at the same time, it kept still in view the King of Prussia and the general interest of Europe. The highest principles of honour and good faith, as well as the strongest inducements of commercial interest, excited and justified us in this conduct. The King of Portugal was now what the King of Prussia had been last year, at the brink of ruin and desolation. To have supported the King of Prussia, now in the current of prosperity and victory, in the same manner and with the same firmness that we had done in the former negotiation, when in the heighth of distress; would have been to inflame and perpetuate the miseries of Germany, and to endanger more than ever

ever that very ballance of Europe that we have all along wanted so much to uphold. Not to have supported the King of Portugal, would have been not only a gross breach of faith and honour; but the most foolish and unpardonable sacrifice of our commerce and trade. Having so far explained this change of objects, we will now proceed to examine the merits of this last negotiation which ended in the treaty of peace.

By the negotiation of 1761, the British dominions in America were greatly extended; and, as already observed, secured as far as they could be at that time. But by the line of limitation then described through the lakes, superior Huron, and Michigan, and the rivers Onabach and Ohio, to the influx of the latter into the Mississippi; many Indian nations occupied very extensive dominions between the two belligerent powers, who were to be under the protection of the two crowns, according to their situation on this or that

side of limitation. Beyond these nations and comprehending part of them, lay an immense country on both sides the river Mississippi, claimed and appertaining to the enemy under the general name of Louisiana. He likewise possessed both sides of the Mississippi, and the Mobile, down to their influx into the gulf of Mexico ; and to the east and south east of this last termination lay Florida, belonging to and occupied by the crown of Spain. These vast countries lying from north to east and south east of the Mississippi, composed not only a region far more fair promising and prolific than that of Canada ; but by their continuity and intermixture not only with the countries of the Indians adjoining, but with our dominions and back settlements, gave the French the same easy opportunity on this side, as they had formerly enjoyed on that of Canada, to harass impede and endanger our colonies by means of the Indians and their own ardent spirit of innovation. In the interval between the breaking off of the last and the

final termination of the present negotiation, His Majesty's arms had brought two important acquisitions into the scale of Great Britain, namely, the conquest of the island of Martinico, <sup>a</sup> and that also of the town and port of the Havana. <sup>b</sup> The reduction of Manila, one of the Philippine islands, happened about the same time; <sup>c</sup> but had no consequence whatever in the negotiation, as not being known till long after the peace was concluded. These acquisitions then of Martinico and the Havana presented an opportunity of amplifying our possessions, and compleating our security and indemnification on the continent, agreeably to the original ideas and motives of the war, by exchanging our new conquests for American territory; or, by insisting on the *uti possidetis*, to keep possession of one or more of the conquered islands, and thereby enlarge  
our

---

<sup>a</sup> Martinico subdued 14th February 1762.

<sup>b</sup> The Havana subdued 13th August same year.

<sup>c</sup> Manila subdued 6th October same year.

our sugar trade. The advantages of the latter were certain and immediately to be felt. The advantages of the former were no less certain, and tho' incomparably more important, were not so obvious, as they cannot be enjoyed in all their extent till a future age. This circumstance is sufficient to explain how impossible it was to proceed upon either plan without being liable to objections, according to the narrow or enlarged view in which the system of the national interest may be considered. For had the British court acted by the plan now recommended by the partisans of opposition, and suffering themselves to have been blinded by the advantages arising from the sugar trade, neglected our more essential interests of North America; we might then have heard, That the negotiators of this peace had given away every advantage and security for which the war was undertaken, and which by the war we had obtained. That the sugar islands, altho' they promoted the trade and riches of the kingdom, rather diminished than  
increased



increased its real strength. That attending to the interests of North America would have been to have secured the strength and power of the nation upon solid foundations, that of the increase and cultivation of the human species, not only in itself the noblest work of government, but by adding so many subjects to the state, would have aggrandized and confirmed its power. That nothing but the superlative ignorance of our ministers could have preferred the advantages arising from the sugar islands to the much more extensive and durable advantages to be derived from the secure possession and improvement of North America: advantages in themselves obvious and demonstrable from all our past and present experience of the benefits arising to Great Britain from the prosperity of our settlements already established there, altho' they had been carried on under every kind of difficulty. That their malevolence and treachery, as well as ignorance, had induced them, in resentment to the man  
who

who had been the life and soul of all our victories, to depart from his judicious plan ; and admitting the enemy again into their vanquished possessions of America, blasted all the fair fruits of the war, and rendered our dominion trade, and even existence, in that region of the world, more precarious than ever. And what would have been worst of all, these complaints and objections would have not only had the warm approbation of popularity ; but, on the strictest scrutiny, truth and reason for their support.—If we add to this ground of difference in opinion, all the force and weight of party, which to the peculiar misfortune of this kingdom subsisted at that time in a very high degree ; all the private animosity, partial views, and interested conduct, that exerts itself in that contracted circle under the mask of public utility and patriot affection : we shall then be able very easily to account to ourselves for all the virulent abuse, and violent outrage, that has been practised by both sides, to the disgrace of  
the

the present age, upon this subject; and be convinced how expedient it is to separate ourselves from popular credulity and party rage, as well as from the alluring authority and glare of a court, to judge with propriety and clearness upon this matter; since act which way soever the ministry would, they could not possibly have avoided, in the present spirit of the times, what has happened.

THE plan of pacification in 1761, so far as both courts had approached towards one another's ideas, was adopted by the British ministry as the foundation of the present negotiation. This not only facilitated the work of peace, but the concessions therein agreed to had been obtained with so much difficulty and altercation, notwithstanding all the vigour resolution and extensive genius of the British minister at that time, that to have rejected it and gone on upon a new system, would have been opening such a wide field of dispute and discussions, and of incompatible in-

N                      terests

terests and prejudices, as must have capitally embarrassed and obstructed the negotiation from the beginning. The intimate connection this plan had with the interest of the nation, with the public and universal sentiment of the kingdom before and after the commencement of the war, and with the motives and causes that had given rise to it, recommended it likewise, as the most perfect system that could be laid down. A happy coincidence of ideas in the two courts rendered this plan the more practicable in its execution: for the victories we had every where obtained, had diverted France from his ardent desire of dominion in North America, and confined his views solely to the recovery of his settlements in the West Indies, and the retaining of the liberty of fishing at Newfoundland; and these very conquests had inspired in the British court the desire of completing perfecting, and securing their dominion in America, as an object of the first and greatest national consideration and consequence. Agreeably to these  
prin-

principles and views, Martinico was given back to France<sup>d</sup>, and the Havana to Spain<sup>e</sup>. In compensation for which, France “intirely abandoned all the Indian nations, and gave up all his extensive claims and possessions of dominion on the left side of the river St Laurence, including Mobile.” He fixed certain clear and indisputable boundaries and barriers between the dominions of the two nations “by a line drawn from the source of the Mississippi, along the middle of that river, to the river Iberville; and from thence along the middle of that river, and the lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain, to the sea.” And he gave up to us, at the same time, “the free navigation of the river Mississippi in its full breadth and length.” Spain likewise ceded “Florida, with fort St Augustine, and the bay of Pensacola; as well as all that Spain possesses on the

N 2

“con-

---

<sup>d</sup> Treaty of Peace, Art 8th.—<sup>e</sup> Ditto, Art 19th.

<sup>f</sup> Ditto, Art 7th.

“ continent of North America, east or to  
 “ the south east of the river Mississippi. ”

These cessions and boundaries we may now venture to affirm, after having already so fully made out their utility and importance, were the most admirable and invaluable acquisitions, and the highest improvement of what had been ceded and agreed by the former negotiation respecting our security, and all the future trade power and riches to be derived from our American empire, that could have been expected or thought of; for the cessions made, and all the points settled by that negotiation relative to this country, were wholly insecure precarious and unsatisfactory without them.

IN respect to the neutral islands, which by the former negotiation were to have been equally divided between the two crowns, with this determined proviso on the part of France, that St Lucia should  
 make

make part of the partition to be regulated in his favour<sup>a</sup>; three of them, viz St Vincent Dominica and Tobago, were by this negotiation declared to remain in full right to Great Britain, and only St Lucia to be delivered to France<sup>1</sup>. Beside these, France likewise ceded and guarantied to His Majesty in full right, the islands of Grenada and the Grenadines<sup>b</sup>. From this simple narration of facts it is self-evident how much the condition agreed to by the former negotiation concerning these neutral islands, is bettered and improved by the condition stipulated in this. In place of two, we have three of them; and in place of the fourth, we have the Grenades and the Grenadines. It is likewise evident what great attention was given to the improvement of our sugar colonies and the West-India trade, after having compleated and secured our first and

---

<sup>a</sup> *Vid.* The last Memorial of France to England, 9th September 1761, Art 5th.

<sup>b</sup> Treaty of Peace, Art 9th.—<sup>c</sup> Ditto, Art 9th

and grand object on the continent of America. The value and importance of these acquisitions are already in part known, notwithstanding the indefatigable art and labour that has been practised to depreciate them. The large purchases that have already been made in the Grenades, and the extensive importations from thence, have opened the eyes even of the strongest prejudice. The island Tobago we know to be fruitful, and much more extensive than any other of the neutral islands. Our settlements there formerly were rendered precarious and even untenable, from the attacks made upon the settlers by the Indians; whereas now that it is fully and intirely in our possession, that the crown has taken it under protection, and that its contiguity to the Grenades affords the means of aid and assistance; we have the fairest prospect of its future importance in commerce. St Lucia would have been highly advantageous to us, by its having an excellent port; in other respects it is as yet uncultivated. But our possession  
of



of it, considering its very near situation to Martinico, would have been sowing the seeds of eternal dissention and animosity between the two crowns: And this inconvenience taken along with the considerable and immediate commercial advantages arising from our possession of the Grenades, and all the other neutral islands, will sufficiently satisfy any fair and unbiassed enquirer, of the expediency and wisdom of relinquishing it; as nothing ought more strictly to be attended to, in making a lasting and solid peace, than to avoid and prevent every occasion that may give rise to future misunderstandings and disputes.

To cede to France the island of St Pierre, under the condition of an English commissary to reside there, and the commander of the British squadron to visit it at pleasure; were rather terms of mortification and punishment, than that we stood in need of any such security. Reflecting upon the hostages demanded and given at  
the

the peace of Aix la Chapelle, it was a just retribution for that affront. But as the British court at that time was more to blame for submitting to it, than even the French were for imposing it; so, at this time, when we had acquired such vast acquisitions and advantages, it was the best and wisest policy to conclude a peace without any, or with as few personal or national affronts as possible; as these of all other things wound the natural pride and honour of a people most, and by that means render the peace so concluded, insupportable and insincere. There is indeed no reason to imagine, that had the two courts been in good humour during the former negotiation, and had they been agreed in the higher and more important objects of the peace, that these terms would have been at all insisted upon; but there having been in all probability a design discovered to overreach on the one side, that no doubt might occasion a just indignation and inflexibility, even in the smallest matters, on the other. To remove

move these obstructions, the present negotiation granted to France the little island of Michelon along with St Pierre; and soothed his honour, by desisting from the imposition of a resident commissary, and the visitations of the British commander of a squadron. In return for which, France agreed to restrict the liberty of his fishing within narrower bounds; and, as formerly, engaged not to raise any fortifications, or erect any buildings, but merely for the fishery; and to keep only a guard of fifty men for the police<sup>1</sup>. By this adjustment we clearly acquired a large and exclusive fishery, and secured the limits of our wide extended coasts and shores with much more certainty from the landing and visitation of the French, than by the former negotiation. For by the 5th article of the treaty of peace, “the subjects of the  
 “most christian King have leave to fish in  
 “the gulph of St Laurence, on condition  
 “that they do not exercise the said fishery  
 O “but

---

<sup>1</sup> Treaty of Peace, Art 6th.

“ but at the distance of three leagues  
 “ from all the coasts belonging to Great  
 “ Britain, as well those of the continent  
 “ as those of the islands situated in the  
 “ said gulph of St. Laurence. And as to  
 “ the fishery on the coasts of the island  
 “ Cape-Breton, the subjects of the most  
 “ christian King shall not be permitted to  
 “ exercise the said fishery but at the dis-  
 “ tance of fifteen leagues from the coasts  
 “ of the island Cape-Breton.” It has  
 been objected to this article, that it is  
 illusory and easily to be evaded, from the  
 difficulty of determining, in the sea, the  
 exact distances prohibited. But this ob-  
 jection can only be of weight with those  
 who are prejudiced and biased to believe  
 every thing on one side, and to admit no-  
 thing as right on the other: for matters in  
 this case are as easily to be determined, as  
 the limits and boundaries at sea of neutral  
 powers, within which no captures can be  
 made; for where any controversy arises  
 on this head, the preparatory examinations,  
 and the course of evidence on the side of  
 the

the captors, and on the side of the captivated, along with the collateral circumstances relating to the behaviour of the captivated at the time of the chase, and at the time when taken; afford as clear and certain means of determining in such matters, as in any general cases that happen in the course of a war.

THE cunette of Dunkirk was agreed to be destroyed, immediately after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty <sup>m</sup>; a point which, tho' inflexibly insisted upon in the former negotiation, was most tenaciously refused by France from the beginning to the end of it. <sup>n</sup>

IN the former negociation France had insisted upon having Senegal, or Goree, restored. The British court persisted on the cession of both in the most ample manner; but declared at the same time,

O 2

“ that

---

<sup>m</sup> Treaty of Peace, Art 13th.

<sup>n</sup> *Vid.* The last Memorial of France to England, 9th September 1761. Art. 4th.

“ that if the court of France would  
 “ suggest any reasonable expedient to  
 “ provide themselves with negroes that  
 “ might not be too detrimental to the  
 “ interests of the British subjects in Africa,  
 “ His Majesty would willingly enter upon  
 “ a discussion of this subject. ” France  
 replied, “ that the King was willing to  
 “ guaranty the possession of Senegal and  
 “ Goree to the crown of England, pro-  
 “ vided England would guaranty the pos-  
 “ session of the settlements of Anamaboo  
 “ and Akra, on the coast of Africa. ”  
 It is evident from these approaches the  
 two courts made towards one another  
 upon this head, notwithstanding their ill  
 humour, that had they been agreed in the  
 more essential point, this would have made  
 no difference between them. Accordingly,  
 upon this last negociation, the British  
 court restored the barren rock of Goree to  
 France,

---

• *Vid.* The Answer of the British Court to the  
 Ultimatum of France, &c. Art 3.

• *Vid.* The last Memorial of France, &c. Art. 3.

France, as an expedient to provide herself with negroes, and the least destructive one to the interests of the British subjects in Africa, all whose settlements were intirely preserved and secured, and the valuable settlement of Senegal added to them.<sup>1</sup>

IN the negociation of 1761 the affairs of the East Indies were totally unadjusted, and agreed to be remitted to the mutual altercations and discussions of the two companies.\* In that of 1762, the British ministry referred to our own East India company what related to that quarter of the world; and when that company had committed a capital error with respect to the stipulations agreed to in the preliminaries, rectified compleatly in the treaty of peace: by which it is stipulated, that  
 “ Great Britain shall restore to France,  
 “ in

---

<sup>1</sup> Treaty of Peace, Art 10th.

\* *Vid.* The Answer of the British Court to the Ultimatum of the Court of France, Art 13th. And the last Memorial of France to England, 9th Sept. 1761, Art 13th.

“ in the condition they are now in, the  
 “ different factories which that crown  
 “ possessed, as well on the coast of Coro-  
 “ mandel and Orixá, as in that of Mala-  
 “ bar, as also in Bengal, at the beginning  
 “ of the year 1749. And His most  
 “ christian Majesty renounces all preten-  
 “ sions to the acquisition which he had  
 “ made on the coast of Coromandel and  
 “ Orixá, since the said beginning of the  
 “ year 1749. His most christian Majesty  
 “ shall restore, on his side, all that he  
 “ may have conquered from Great Britain  
 “ in the East Indies during the present  
 “ war; and will expressly cause Nattal  
 “ and Tapanouilly in the island of Sumatra  
 “ to be restored; He engages further, not  
 “ to erect fortifications, or to keep troops  
 “ in any part of the dominions of the  
 “ Subah of Bengal; and in order to pre-  
 “ serve future peace on the coast of Coro-  
 “ mandel and Orixá, the English and  
 “ French shall acknowledge Mahomet  
 “ Ally Khan for lawful Nabob of the  
 “ Carnatick, and Salabat Jing for lawful  
 “ Subah



“Subah of the Decan, &c.” The condition in which the French factories were restored, was with their fortification and defences wholly and entirely demolished: and whilst a becoming and commendable moderation was shewn in restoring to that crown his former possessions there, a most prudent and laudable precaution was taken for removing future danger to ourselves from his neighbourhood, by depriving him of fortifications and troops in the dominions of Bengal, and bringing him to acknowledge the same Subahs that we acknowledged. Half a century at least, without these precautions, would have restored the French to their former prosperity and importance; and with all these precautions taken and advantages on our side, it will be our fault certainly, if ever they rival us there again.

THE court of France had most inflexibly persisted, in every part of the former

former negotiation, that “ the captures  
 “ made at sea by England before the de-  
 “ claration of war, were objects of legal  
 “ restitution; and as such, challenged the  
 “ right of nations, that some expedient  
 “ might be agreed upon in the treaty as a  
 “ recompence for them. ’ ” In this ne-  
 gociation he desisted from every part of  
 this very extensive demand, and gave up  
 the whole controversy.

IN 1761, no provision whatever had  
 been made for the reimbursement of the  
 expences incurred by the maintenance of  
 the prisoners of war, which amounted to  
 a very important sum in our favour. In  
 1762, the treaty of peace stipulates, that  
 “ each crown respectively shall pay the  
 “ advances which shall have been made  
 “ for the subsistence and maintenance of  
 “ these prisoners, by the sovereign of the  
 “ country where they shall have been  
 detained:

---

’ *Vid.* The last Memorial of France to England,  
 &c. Art 10th.

“ detained : and securities shall be reciprocally given for the payment of the debts which the prisoners shall have contracted in the countries where they have been detained, until their entire liberty. ” ”

IN the first negociation, the Canadian bills due by the crown of France had made no part of the deliberations. In the last, by the treaty of peace, “ His most christian Majesty declares, that they shall be punctually paid, agreeable to the liquidation made, in a convenient time, according to the distance of the places and to what shall be possible. ” ”

Thus far the merits of the peace as respecting its first grand object, have been considered in a comparative view with  
P the

---

“ Treaty of Peace, Art 3d.

\* Declaration of His most christian Majesty's Plenipotentiary with regard to the debts due to the Canadians.

the negociation of 1761 ; and as respecting the interests of Great Britain, connected with the motives and causes of the war ; and other interests of an inferior degree.

THE second grand object was, the King and kingdom of Portugal ; yet still keeping sight of the King of Prussia, and the general interest of Europe. Our firm attachment to the King of Prussia was founded and justified upon the combined association against him of the powers of Austria Germany Russia France Sweden and Saxony, by which the protestant interest, the liberties of Germany, and the ballance of Europe were in the last and most imminent danger. In 1761, he was almost stript of all his dominions ; and heaven and his good fortune seemed finally to abandon him. In this desperate situation of his affairs Great Britain was his only ally, and the British court, during the negociation of that year, stood immoveably fixed in his interest, and determined

terminated to support him with efficacy and vigour in his last extremities. In 1762 his good fortune again returned to him; and heaven becoming propitious, cleared the sky, dispelled the storm, and elevated him once more to the summit of victory conquest and glory! His implacable enemy, the Empress Elizabeth, died. The Czar, Peter the Third, succeeded her. Russia then became his friend; generously restored him all the great and important acquisitions that had been made upon him in that quarter; and even assisted him with an army to contend with the rest of the confederates. Peter was soon taken off. The present Empress Catharine seized on the reins of government: and tho' she recalled the Russian troops, she nevertheless adhered strictly to the treaty of peace which her husband had made with Prussia, and faithfully evacuated all the Russian conquests. The British minister at Petersburg employed all the influence of the British court there, with indefatigable address,

in support of all these favourable events. Sweden had early followed the example of the Czar Peter, in entering into terms of accommodation with the court of Berlin. In the midst of this auspicious turn of fortune in Germany, the negotiation was opened and carried on between Great Britain and France. The British court now saw Russia, the most powerful member of that most threatening and formidable alliance which had combined for the destruction of Prussia, taken off and united with him in friendship. Sweden had likewise become his friend. Saxony was ruined and without all power to hurt. The arms together with the genius of the Prussian Monarch were an overmatch for those of the house of Austria. Europe demanded peace. The most essential interests of Great Britain required it. The end for which the German war was undertaken, was answered. Prussia was reinstated in all his royal dominions, and master of Silesia. In order therefore that he might make peace, and  
secure

secure himself with the greatest advantage, it was only necessary to take off France from giving any further aid or assistance to Austria; and for that purpose it was stipulated, " that France should evacuate " Cleves Wesel Guelders, and all the dominions belonging to the King of Prussia; that the armies of both crowns should evacuate the countries they occupied in Westphalia, lower Saxony, on the lower Rhine, the upper Rhine, and all the empire, and retreat into the dominions of their respective sovereigns. " And both crowns engaged and promised to each other not to furnish any succours of any kind, to their respective allies, who should continue engaged in the war in Germany. ' " For the court of London to have continued the war at this time, would have been to have sacrificed all the interest of Great Britain, in order to give the King of Prussia a chance of becoming a conqueror. To conclude peace

peace with France, and take off that powerful and only remaining ally of the house of Austria, was to second Prussia's good fortune, and place him in a road of victory, which must lead him to the most equitable fair and advantageous peace, and secure all the ends for which the war was undertaken. It was indeed to do him a much greater service, than to have continued the war, and by that means kept France attached to Austria. For the French were always greatly superior to us in their number of troops; and all that we could do, even with the abilities of a general infinitely superior to all those of the enemy, was only to maintain a defensive war, without giving actual and effective assistance to our ally. But by agreeing at this time to the propositions of France, and leaving Prussia and Austria to themselves, we took off the weight of France from the scale of Austria; and by disbanding our armies in Germany, threw an actual and most valuable supply of veteran soldiers, with one of the best and most



most fortunate generals in Europe, into the scale of Prussia, should he find it necessary for obtaining his purposes to pursue his conquests. Having thus yielded to the propositions of France, and in yielding opened the way for the King of Prussia to a secure and advantageous peace; the court of London remained firm and inflexibly fixed upon the salvation of the King and kingdom of Portugal. Here was an ally that of himself could not have stood a moment before the united force of his enemies. His kingdom actually attacked; whole provinces giving way; and his seat of government ready to be overturned: what object so worthy and noble as this for the exercise of the good faith, magnanimity, and heroism of Great Britain! We had sent a handful of troops to his assistance. They behaved with a spirit gallantry and eclat, worthy of their country; but they were wholly insufficient to ward off the fatal calamity, and we wholly unable to afford greater and fresh supplies. Here in a most distinguished manner

manner appeared the effects of our naval conquests of 1762; and the fortitude of the British court in being now as firm and immoveable in the cause of Portugal, as formerly on a like occasion in the cause of Prussia. France and Spain yielded in their turn to our propositions, and restored the King of Portugal to the full sovereignty and possession of all his dominions, as well in Europe, as in America Africa and the East Indies. <sup>2</sup>

THUS far the merits of the peace in its second grand object have been considered; and we see how both in the one and the other, it had a direct or collateral relation to the negociation of 1761, and how much it enlarged and improved that plan. But it likewise took in and adjusted a new object, which had respect to the differences subsisting between the crowns of Great Britain and Spain; which had been rejected with great propriety in the

---

<sup>2</sup> Treaty of Peace, Art 21st.

the former conferences with France, because of the manner in which it had been obtruded.

THESE differences consisted of three particulars, in which Spain demanded

1st, The restitution of some captures, which had been made upon the Spanish flag during the present war.

2d, The privilege of the Spanish nation, to fish upon the banks of Newfoundland.

3d, The demolition of the English settlements, made upon the Spanish territories in the bay of Honduras.

THE first respecting the prizes was referred to the courts of justice of the admiralty of Great Britain. \*

AND as to the second, which respects the fishery, " His most catholic Majesty  
" desists, as well for himself, as for his  
Q " suc-

---

\* Treaty of Peace, Art 16th.

“ successors, from all pretensions which  
“ he may have formed, in favour of the  
“ Guipuscoans, and other his subjects, to  
“ the right of fishing in the neighbour-  
“ hood of the island of Newfoundland. ”

AND as to the third, respecting Honduras,  
“ His Britannick Majesty shall cause to be  
“ demolished all the fortifications which  
“ his subjects shall have erected in the  
“ bay of Honduras, and other places in  
“ the territory of Spain in that part of  
“ the world, four months after the rati-  
“ fication of the present treaty; and His  
“ catholic Majesty shall not permit His  
“ Britannick Majesty’s subjects, or their  
“ workmen, to be disturbed, or molested,  
“ under any pretence whatsoever, in the  
“ said places, in their occupation of cutt-  
“ ing, loading and carrying away log-  
“ wood: and for this purpose, they may  
“ build without hindrance, and occupy  
“ without interruption, the houses and  
“ maga-

“ magazines which are necessary for them,  
 “ for their families, and for their effects ;  
 “ and His catholic Majesty assures to  
 “ them, by this article, the full enjoy-  
 “ ment of those advantages, and powers,  
 “ on the Spanish coasts and territories, as  
 “ above stipulated, immediately after the  
 “ ratification of the present treaty ‘ .”

THESE adjustments of the Spanish de-  
 mands exactly agree with what the Bri-  
 tish court voluntarily offered to the court  
 of Spain in the instructions transmitted by  
 Mr P— at London to Lord B—— at  
 Madrid, under the 28th of July 1761,  
 immediately after the French court had  
 been repulsed in their attempts to intro-  
 duce the complaints of Spain as a part of  
 their negociation, and His catholic Ma-  
 jesty as the guarantee of the treaty. This  
 circumstance, whilst it proves the pro-  
 priety and equity of the British minister’s  
 conduct at that time, and the folly and

Q 2

in-

---

‘ Treaty of Peace, Art 17th.

injustice of the Spanish court in commencing a war for what they readily gave up in every point at making peace; shews likewise the incoherence inconsistency and virulence of the spirit of party, in the objections that have been thrown out to this part of the peace. For it has been contended and insisted upon, that we had a right to the possession of the bay of Honduras; and that the forts erected there were our security; and by giving up those forts, and admitting the Spanish claim to the right of possession of the bay of Honduras, we remain now without any security, and depend intirely on the good will and sufferance of that nation for our logwood trade. Now, admitting this objection, for arguments sake only, in its full strength; it would not be the folly or fault of the minister in 1762, but of the minister in 1761. Yet the real fact is, that the lawless buccaneers of America were the first who introduced us to this trade, and gave rise to those settlements and forts; if either the one or the other  
may

may deserve those names in that part of the country. The crown of Spain possessed incontrovertably the sovereignty and dominion of those parts, and complained loudly from the beginning of the intrusion and innovation that had been made upon that part of his territory. This subject of complaint continued from that time to this. It was, along with the contraband trade, the cause of a war; and hurt the pride and augmented the disgust of that court towards Great Britain, which has, in the issue, very eminently injured our commercial interests with Spain, and advanced those of France. The minister of 1761 was too wise and too vigilant, as well as too honest and firm, to admit or give up any such point of consequence as the Spanish right of dominion in the bay of Honduras, had it not clearly and undeniably existed. He therefore persisted in our right to the logwood trade, and acknowledged the crown of Spain to have the right of dominion in the country; and the minister or ministers of 1762 would

would have certainly been either much unacquainted with the state of things, or much too captious, to have deviated from so clear and equitable a plan of pacification. As to the point of security, the subjects of Great Britain have not only all the security that the subjects of any crown on earth have in the dominions of any other crown; but by this article of the treaty of peace have acquired a legal and acknowledged right to the logwood trade, and to build and occupy houses and magazines for their families and effects: and are assured, by His catholic Majesty, of the full enjoyment of those advantages and powers on the Spanish coast and territories, as stipulated in the said article. This assurance is a security for advantages and powers far beyond what the subjects of any state, considered as such, have in the dominions of any other state. And the whole of this article being a condition on the one part and the other, not an act of grace and favour in the Spanish crown that may be withdrawn at pleasure; should any innovations



vations be made and persisted in, on the side of Spain, it may give us a just title and claim to a further and stronger security, that of protecting ourselves on account of the ill observance of his part of the stipulated condition: which is a point of so much importance, that whilst it is duly attended to, it may be reasonably presumed, the court of Spain will, for their own sake, think it their interest, most religiously to observe their part of the condition, and allow us the full enjoyment of the advantages and powers confirmed to us by this article of the treaty of peace.

AN objection hath likewise been started, which is, indeed, rather a criticism upon the mode of expression, than an objection against the merit of the second article of adjustment with Spain, concerning the the right of fishing on the banks of Newfoundland. It is confined entirely to the word *DESIST*, which has been represented as too vague and equivocal an expression.

pression. Had Spain been ever acknowledged by us to have had that right of fishing in the neighbourhood of Newfoundland, to cede restore or renounce such right, would have been very proper: but to cede restore or renounce a right which we never acknowledged to exist, would have appeared not only a little exceptionable in point of language, but, in a political sense, would have been to have granted a great deal too much. To desist from a right which a person has formed to himself, and which was not acknowledged by the person or party, from whom he claimed, seems very easy to be understood; and, in the plain simple sense of the word, denotes that right to cease and be annihilated. For as the right was formed by himself, it existed only by his persisting in it; when therefore he desisted from, or ceased to persist in it, it lost its existence and became a nonentity. In terms of the article therefore to "desist  
 " as well for himself as his successors  
 " from all pretensions which he may have  
 " formed

“formed,” was, very clearly and explicitly, to declare, that that right, or those pretensions, were extinguished ceased and annihilated for ever. On duly reflecting on the import of the word *DESIST* in this article, and the nature of the right that was to be given up, it may perhaps, notwithstanding all that has been said against it, appear not only proper, but the fullest and most adequate term that could have been made use of upon this occasion.

FROM this survey of the peace and the merits of the two several negociations of 1761 and 1762, this conclusion necessarily results; that the end and motive of the war, and national indemnification and security, were strictly attended to, and were the primary objects of both: that the acquisitions of Martinico and the Havana were made use of in the treaty of peace, to improve augment and perfect these views, not only by the richness and extent of the additional dominions thereby ceded and added to the crown of Great Britain

R

in

in the regions of North America; but by the boundary and line of security drawn between us and the French, by which we have the Indian nations left intirely to our own management, and without which the whole that had been obtained in the negociation of 1761 would have been intirely precarious and insecure: that whatever tended to an adjustment in the first, was advantageously settled and established by the last: that whatever was tenaciously and obstinately refused by the enemy in the first, was wholly and absolutely given up by him in the last: that what had made no part of the first conferences, was to the interest and emolument of Great Britain adjusted and fixed by the last: and that after having amplified improved and secured this first grand and national object of dominion in North America, the negociation of 1761 was likewise highly improved by the valuable acquisitions of three in place of two of the neutral islands, and the cession of the Grenades and Grenadines, which made up  
no

no part of that first negociation.—That in respect of the second grand object, the treaty of peace not only opened the way and facilitated the accommodation of the king of Prussia with the house of Austria, by which he obtained all the objects and advantages for which the war had been undertaken; but rescued the King and kingdom of Portugal from inevitable conquest and desolation: an object not only worthy of the greatest magnanimity and heroism, but which comprehended in it in a very eminent degree the commercial interest and felicity of Great Britain.—That along with these two grand objects, the treaty of peace adjusted our differences with Spain upon terms the most honourable for the nation, being the very same which the court and minister of Great Britain had voluntarily offered him in 1761.—And finally that the plan of peace in 1761 being not only perfected in all respects, but also enlarged and augmented by acquisitions of much higher importance and value by the treaty of

in the regions of North America; but by the boundary and line of security drawn between us and the French, by which we have the Indian nations left intirely to our own management, and without which the whole that had been obtained in the negociation of 1761 would have been intirely precarious and insecure: that whatever tended to an adjustment in the first, was advantageously settled and established by the last: that whatever was tenaciously and obstinately refused by the enemy in the first, was wholly and absolutely given up by him in the last: that what had made no part of the first conferences, was to the interest and emolument of Great Britain adjusted and fixed by the last: and that after having amplified improved and secured this first grand and national object of dominion in North America, the negociation of 1761 was likewise highly improved by the valuable acquisitions of three in place of two of the neutral islands, and the cession of the Grenades and Grenadines, which made up  
no

no part of that first negociation.—That in respect of the second grand object, the treaty of peace not only opened the way and facilitated the accommodation of the king of Prussia with the house of Austria, by which he obtained all the objects and advantages for which the war had been undertaken; but rescued the King and kingdom of Portugal from inevitable conquest and desolation: an object not only worthy of the greatest magnanimity and heroism, but which comprehended in it in a very eminent degree the commercial interest and felicity of Great Britain.—That along with these two grand objects, the treaty of peace adjusted our differences with Spain upon terms the most honourable for the nation, being the very same which the court and minister of Great Britain had voluntarily offered him in 1761.—And finally that the plan of peace in 1761 being not only perfected in all respects, but also enlarged and augmented by acquisitions of much higher importance and value by the treaty of

in the regions of North America; but by the boundary and line of security drawn between us and the French, by which we have the Indian nations left intirely to our own management, and without which the whole that had been obtained in the negociation of 1761 would have been intirely precarious and insecure: that whatever tended to an adjustment in the first, was advantageously settled and established by the last: that whatever was tenaciously and obstinately refused by the enemy in the first, was wholly and absolutely given up by him in the last: that what had made no part of the first conferences, was to the interest and emolument of Great Britain adjusted and fixed by the last: and that after having amplified improved and secured this first grand and national object of dominion in North America, the negociation of 1761 was likewise highly improved by the valuable acquisitions of three in place of two of the neutral islands, and the cession of the Grenades and Grenadines, which made up  
no



no part of that first negociation.—That in respect of the second grand object, the treaty of peace not only opened the way and facilitated the accommodation of the king of Prussia with the house of Austria, by which he obtained all the objects and advantages for which the war had been undertaken; but rescued the King and kingdom of Portugal from inevitable conquest and desolation: an object not only worthy of the greatest magnanimity and heroism, but which comprehended in it in a very eminent degree the commercial interest and felicity of Great Britain.—That along with these two grand objects, the treaty of peace adjusted our differences with Spain upon terms the most honourable for the nation, being the very same which the court and minister of Great Britain had voluntarily offered him in 1761.—And finally that the plan of peace in 1761 being not only perfected in all respects, but also enlarged and augmented by acquisitions of much higher importance and value by the treaty of

peace in 1762; whatever praise is due to the former, the same highly accumulated and increased must of course be due to the latter.—The blind fury of passion and party keeps this circumstance from being attended to; yet it is nevertheless necessarily true, that these negotiations must stand or fall one with the other: for if the plan was good in 1761, the improvements added to it in 1762 made it so much better. And thus, after all, we find that the true interest of Mr P— and Lord B—, or the partisans of 1761 and 1762, however violently they jostle one another, is, in so far as relates to the peace, one and the same; and that to act with consistency, or have any lasting national applause, they must agree and support one another in this one point, let them differ ever so much in personal and private views about the disposal of places and managing the treasure and power of the nation.

It was observed in setting out upon this disquisition, that the preliminaries of  
peace

peace were approved of by parliament; and it becomes now of importance to insist further upon this very material circumstance. The opinion and judgment and acts of parliament are the legal and constitutional opinion and judgment and acts of the nation. It has been said, and will readily be admitted, that parliaments are not infallible; but neither is the nation, were her voice taken by poll. It has been said too, that parliaments may be influenced by passion, by party, by bribery and corruption; and so likewise may the nation. All may have heard, and many may have known this to have been the case, to a certain degree, both of the one and the other; and happy would it have been for the cause of virtue liberty and the constitution, had all these evils been prevented and removed, as far as it was at two periods evidently within the power of human wisdom and true patriot affection to have prevented and remedied them. But it will nevertheless remain true, that the voice and sentiment of parliament  
is

is the only regular and constitutional standard and criterion that we have of the voice and sentiment of the nation. The Prince therefore endowed with the highest patriot virtue, and the utmost benevolence and affection towards the freedom liberty and happiness of his people, will be who in the execution of his royal powers and prerogatives, and in the accomplishment of the measures and plans he has laid down for the honour advantage and utility of his people, consults with and takes the opinion of his parliament as far as the nature of the transaction he has in hand will permit; that from thence, as from the only true and constitutional source, he may know the minds and sentiments of his people concerning the object of his pursuit. Ministers therefore acting under such a prince, encouraging within their respective spheres so amiable a disposition, and desirous of having their own conduct in bringing about his measures inspected and judged of by the national council, act upon the most enlarged plan of popular liberty,

liberty, and most agreeably to the genius and spirit of the British constitution. And those transactions thus brought about and carried into execution with the sanction and approbation of parliament, are therefore the most national, most constitutional, and most perfect acts that can exist in the state. This is most strictly and truly the case of that very treaty of peace, which we have now had under consideration. The King glorying in the superlative dignity of reigning in the hearts and affections of a great and free people, and his ministers ambitious to submit their conduct to the disquisitions and judgment of the national council, after having exerted the prerogative of the crown in adjusting the preliminaries of peace with the enemy, freely referred those preliminaries themselves to the discussion and opinion of parliament. The parliament in one of its fullest sessions in 1762, approved of them in the most conspicuous and distinguished manner; the house of Lords without the least division, and the house of commons with such

such a division as was of the very least importance, and expressed much more properly the impotent acrimony of private pique and disgust in a very few individuals, than any difference in public opinion and sentiment. The King and his ministers, supported thus by the public, the known, the co-operating voice and sentiment of his people expressed in parliament, proceeded in the work of peace, and finally adjusted it by the definitive treaty. Addresses of congratulation were presented to the throne from all quarters of the kingdom in consequence of this event; and on the subsequent session, in November 1763, the parliament again, by addresses from both houses, renewed its approbation in the amplest terms of grateful satisfaction and acquiescence. This fact alone would establish and vindicate the peace as a national and constitutional act, whatever faults were to be found in it. For the same reason it would vindicate and justify the ministers concerned in negotiating it, because mere invo-

involuntary errors and mistakes are, in fallible beings, no ground of just reprehension. But when the merits of the peace, as already displayed, are taken into view, the motives of the war accomplished, inestimable advantages gained, together with perfect security in the improvement and enjoyment of them; it becomes then a peace worthy of our highest applause, and the ministers of it merit surely in course some eminent degree of our thanks and esteem.

THE virulence and violence of party, and the facility with which it dispenses with all regard to truth and decency, is in nothing more conspicuous, than in imputing this peace to the single arbitrary act of Lord B—; unless it be that most insolent and enormous falsehood, by which the judgment and approbation of parliament has been impeached, in the eye of the public, with having been influenced by bribery and corruption.—Bribed and corrupted to do what?—To make a peace,  
S that

that is repleat with the most essential and permanent advantages to the nation, at the whole expence and loss of the enemy; a peace that extends her dominion, enlarges her power, and amplifies and improves her commerce upon the most solid lasting and formidable foundations; a peace that prevented her from being overwhelmed with bankruptcy and ruin, which must have been her lot by protracting the war under the necessary and unavoidable circumstances of a more exorbitant increase of her already enormous and almost insupportable public debt; a peace that put a stop to the farther effusion of the blood of her gallant sons, already too much exhausted by the war, and in their preservation preserved in vigour, what solely depended upon them, and was for want of hands in the greatest hazard of being lost, her trade her commerce and agriculture; a peace that annihilated and prevented the immediate and most direful effects of the most abandoned attempt that could be devised by the most profligate spirit



spirit of any faction, that of raising internal civil dissention discord and sedition, by animating and inspiring one part of the kingdom and people with jealousy contempt and hatred of the other, when the highest unanimity and the whole and intire force of the nation was all little enough to prosecute with success the grand object of the war; in short a peace that terminated a most destructive tho' prosperous war, not only with honour and justice, but to the highest national advantage and utility, and which notwithstanding all the passion prejudice and indecency of party, is and cannot but be universally acknowledged as the best peace ever Great Britain made?—Are these the objects that are to be ascertained by bribery and corruption?—Certainly not.—The merit of such conduct justifies the actors, and the plan itself the approvers of it. Were it even possible that the court was under the necessity of exercising bribery and corruption to procure the national approbation to such a peace as this,

truth would compel us for the first time to acknowledge, that in this single case, whatever idea we had of the corrupted, the corruptors merited our highest praise. But in so heavy, so criminal and detestable an accusation as this, should we not have some proof, some semblance and shadow of evidence at least, to influence our belief? Are general warrants such dreadful things? Is the confinement of one man taken up by this kind of warrant, which has in like cases been the practice of every administration since the revolution, so shocking in the eye of the public, and so tremendously dangerous to liberty, as to agitate the courts of law, and engross the attention of the nation; and is the honour fame and reputation of so many illustrious individuals, as compose the legislature, of no moment? Is the honour fame and reputation of the nation itself, known and appearing only by the medium of this august body, of no sort of estimation? What can tend more immediately to stir up unjust discontent and sedition among the people,

to the overturning of all order respect and obedience in the state, than to impress upon the minds of men this idea, that the public money is dissipated in the cause of corruption, and that the whole parliament is the passive object and patient, influenced and acting under this mercenary leading and direction? And shall the gross insinuations to this purpose of one unhappy and infatuated man, the dupe of his own vanity and passion, the tool and firebrand of a party, be received and propagated with success, and he himself become the object of our compassion; whilst leaving the side of candour and judgment, we suffer ourselves to be impressed with the basest and falsest ideas of our government and legislature?—It is impossible.—The good sense of the nation, altho' vigorously attacked, has not yet been demolished. The natural honour integrity and justice of the people, however sometimes they may be misled, are still attached to the interest of truth order and the constitution. Even those who have been  
most

most seduced by misrepresentation passion prejudice, or the fairer allurements of friendship and honour, as soon as they recollect themselves, as soon as they can think and reason with coolness and precision, will discern the weakness and folly of imputing undue influence to parliament as the motive of its approbation of the peace, since this charge involves equally in guilt the gentlemen of the opposition, with those who still adhere to the government; for almost the whole of those gentlemen of both houses of parliament who are now in the opposition, concurred in approving the preliminaries of peace. They will readily admit and allow, that to procure the unanimous voice of one house, and almost the unanimous voice of the other, would have required more money than the government could possibly bestow. In viewing the present parliament in point of property riches and rank, they will necessarily acknowledge, that the members of it are at least presumptively as little liable to temptation and undue in-

influence, as any parliament that ever existed before; and therefore that some degree of evidence is requisite to make good with the public the loose vague and passionate imputation of corruption. Did any such evidence exist, they must grant, that none are better qualified to expose it to the public eye, both in point of ability and long experience, than some of the gentlemen in the opposition. The ability and intrepidity of Mr P— is universally acknowledged; to the long and active experience of His Grace of N—— in political manœuvres, every borough city and county in Great Britain will bear witness: wherefore it might have been expected, that the disinterested patriot affection of the first would have prompted him from conscientious duty, as resentment and the love of power might have impelled the latter to have brought this black iniquity to light, and in open day to have flashed conviction on the contaminated chiefs in power, under the broad sunshine of the people, had any such iniquity

quity ever had a being. In fine, they will be thoroughly convinced, that no sums adequate to such a service could have been expended without the chiefs of the opposition, who are so well acquainted with the affairs of the treasury and the business of parliament, having been able in spite of any majority whatever to have detected and exposed the fraud at auditing in parliament the annual accompts of the nation; and from their not having done it, they will naturally and truly conclude, that there was no just ground for them to proceed upon, and that the gentleman who threw out this imputation, has only, as usual, exercised his wit to deceive and mislead them.

WHEN they can think without passion and judge without prejudice, they will perceive this opposition in itself to have commenced upon the narrowest selfish motives of private pique and resentment; and that individuals, stimulated by vanity pride and the ambition of being formidable

able to the administration, have carried it on upon principles the most destructive to the liberty, and most ruinous to the tranquillity power and greatness of the nation. For whatever personal animosity might have subsisted between the chiefs of the opposition and the gentlemen of the administration, whatever real or imaginary injuries might have been apprehended to have been received by the very remarkable gentleman himself when he first seized the pen in 1762, as the perturbator of the public peace and destroyer of national unanimity; candour must oblige them to confess, that the war, the public interest, and the high concerns of the nation, were at no time pushed on with greater vigour, or managed with more judgment and success, than in the several campaigns of that year. This alone were sufficient to prove, that the cause and interest of the public was out of the question; and however strong the resentment might have been against those in the administration, as men and as personal rivals in power to  
T the

the chiefs of his party, it ought in patriot-justice to have secured them against all attacks as ministers.—They will readily discover, that on the commencement of this attack, far from impeaching public and political conduct, far from approving himself the friend of the people and the constitution, he began by subverting the peace and security of the public, in attempting to destroy a most essential part of the constitution.

No part of the constitution stands upon a more solemn act and compact, than the union of the two kingdoms of England and Scotland, by which they are incorporated into one kingdom and one people. No act of state, whether considered by itself or in its consequences, did ever conduce more to the power greatness and felicity of the united people and kingdom, than this very act has done by its natural tendency to bind and unite them in the same common cause and interest in peace and war ; by  
which



which the wealth and grandeur of the nation has been enlarged, and its force and influence in the world extended, in a most remarkable degree. In flat contradiction to this most solemn act, this gentleman revived the invidious and justly abolished distinction of Englishman and Scotchman, and maintained and inculcated this new absurd and most malevolent doctrine, that Scotchmen are foreigners and enemies to Englishmen, and have opposite interests and views; and by this means exerted, with indefatigable diligence, all his power of wit passion and calumny, to imbitter and enrage the hearts of the people of both these parts of the kingdom, with all the violence rancour and hatred of one another that former ages had produced, when they were really two distant people, and kingdoms having opposite interests, and contending with one another for security dominion and glory. They will readily discover and acknowledge, that had this doctrine at the time it was published, which was in

the most critical and trying part of the war, taken root in the minds of the people, and once infatuated our army and navy ; this masked hero of liberty would have had the melancholy joy, however successful he might have been in overturning the ministry and advancing his own private fortune, of seeing the glory of his country and all her important acquisitions more suddenly lost by the mutual jealousy sedition and enmity of her sons, than they had been gained by their unparalleled bravery, or than the united efforts of all her open and secret foreign enemies could have effected. Reflecting on this, and recollecting that the motive for entering upon this horrid and unnatural measure, was only to get at the means of defaming one man upon the local distinction of his birth, by exhibiting him to the people under the character of a favorite, a foreigner, a proud arrogant and incapable Scott, an enemy to the people, and a favourer of rebellion and the pretender ; and by expelling him and the rest of the  
**King's**

King's ministers from the foot of the throne, to occupy their places by the chiefs of his party, and under them by himself: they will be amazed at the enterprize, and pity and abhor the weakness and foulness of that heart, which could throw aside every kind humane and public feeling, and attempt to involve his country in the hazard of utter destruction, in order to gratify the ignoble impulses of private ambition pride and resentment.

THEY will call to mind the caballistical history of Whigs and Tories. How often they have rent the people into the most destructive factions. How severely they have in their turns persecuted and calumniated their opponents. How much they have soured the temper, divided the interests, and weakened the natural strength and influence of the nation. How at times they have blended together, seperated again, coaxed and abused one another; and even changed their very nature and essence according to their particular

ticular interests and necessities, and as they have been in or out of power. Thus have we seen the Whigs, in support of their administration, acting upon Tory principles; and the Tories in the opposition, act upon the broad bottom of liberty and sound original whiggism; whilst the good-natured well-meaning people aiming only at the removal of their grievances, and the security of their liberties, have been seduced and animated into the utmost personal violence and enmity; and after a thousand times trusting hoping and expecting, have seen the ends and purposes of their chieftans and leaders fully served, but themselves and interests deserted.—They will remember, upon what terms Mr P— was admitted to, and undertook the lead in one department of government; how leaving the treasury and the civil and internal administration of the kingdom to the conduct of those in whose hands he found them, he confined himself intirely to the management of the war. In guiding and directing this important charge,

charge, they will keep full in their eye, as the immediate and efficient cause of all his glory and success, the generous disinterested impartial plan he went upon. In his own noble nature not to be controuled by the interested self-seeking views of factions, he embraced them all as the sons of liberty, and members of the same constitution, but none as a party. He looked for merit in every soil, and under every denomination; and when he found it, he nourished it, employed it in the public service, and afforded it a fair opportunity for the full exertion of all its abilities. Even those who had been the declared enemies of the crown, and fought against it in the rebellion of 1715, he embraced and took under his protection. He generously trusted them, and they most honourably and faithfully answered to the trust reposed in them. Thus that part of the highlands which had always since the revolution fostered rebellion, and which under a timid and interested administration always might have done so, was reduced

duced by generous confidence to faithful subjection, and afforded a valuable quota of strength and martial spirit in the prosecution of the war. And thus, by uniting the whole strength affection and power of the nation against her enemies, he amazed all Europe with victories and conquests beyond what she had ever been thought able to effect. At this time neither the names of Whigs nor Tories, Englishmen nor Scotchmen, were heard of as distinctions and grounds of enmity; but the arms of Great Britain, and the fame and valour of her united sons, were what we heard of, and acknowledged, in all quarters of the world.

THEY will remember when our present most amiable Sovereign ascended the throne, and gloried in being born a Briton, that he, and agreeably to his great and royal inclinations his servants and ministers who had attended him into the government, being determined to improve upon this plan by extending it to the  
civil

civil as well as military departments of the state, declared that His Majesty's ambition was to be the Sovereign not of a party or faction, but of the whole of his people; not to govern the interests of a few ambitious or avaricious men, but to employ men of merit and worth under whatever faction they might have been formerly ranked; and to reign in the hearts of his people without the aids of bribery and corruption, according to the true genius and spirit of the laws and constitution. So great a blessing, before this auspicious period, might have been wished for, but was not to be expected; and happy had it been could the ignoble spirit of party have submitted, without a struggle, to such salutary and benevolent dispositions in a sovereign.

WHEN Mr P— resigned, they will recollect that it happened solely, tho' most unfortunately, from a difference in opinion upon a question at that time very dubious and uncertain, respecting what should be

U the

the conduct of Great Britain towards Spain; a question in which the duke of N—— and all the members of the council, except Lord T——, were clearly of an opposite opinion to Mr P—. This resignation however had no immediate extraordinary consequences. The King and his ministers proceeded in their plan. Lord E.—— was appointed to succeed Mr P—. Vigorous measures were pursued in regard to the war; and Mr P— himself, far from opposing, strengthened the hands of government with his hearty concurrence in raising the supplies for the service of the year 1762. But in the May following, as the King's plan extended in its execution of embracing and taking into the assistance of government whomsoever he thought worthy of being honoured with his confidence without distinction of parties; the bottom of administration became enlarged, the influence of the old system grew more and more contracted; and, disgusted at this alteration, His Grace of N—— resigned.

HERE



HERE commences the æra of the present opposition.—So ancient a servant of the crown, so veteran a leader of a party, so trained and expert in intrigue, and who in the course of his administration in different apartments, and especially in the treasury, had served or obliged almost every man in or connected with government, must necessarily have strong personal influence, formidable alliances, and numerous dependents. Hope fear and even gratitude brought many immediately to espouse his fortunes. The open and avowed attack made upon the administration by those who remained behind, brought about their expulsion from the places they had retained; and the clamour and resentment of all those, who as friends or relations to the one or other were affected by it, augmented the number and ill humour of the party. As approaches were made towards an amicable accommodation between the belligerent powers, fresh acquisitions were gained to this side

from the extreme martial spirit of the people themselves, and the interests of those whose fortunes depended upon the continuance of the war; which of course made both of them averse to the peace.—Supported by so formidable a body, the political batteries of defamation began to open, and were incessantly plied against the government. All that wit humour fancy or malice could invent, was played off to captivate and ensnare the public, and to misrepresent and blacken the King's servants.—To have encountered fair, and acknowledged His Majesty's generous constitutional plan of government, must have ruined their cause; for the people would then have readily seen through all their fallacy, and been convinced that measures and not men, ought to be the object of attention: that the interest of the nation, not that of a party, should be preferred; and that a system of government embracing and comprehending all parties, would necessarily abolish them, bring about universal harmony, and fix the future

ture standard of judgment concerning a good or bad administration, to its conformity with or deviation from the laws and constitution, not the interest of the caballistical factions whether Whig or Tory.— For this reason therefore the engineers employed in this foul work, deepened their disguise; and knowing the habitude of the nation to serve the purposes of a few individuals under the notion of their being of this or that sect, and that Whig and Tory had on many occasions been as successful in raising confusion and serving the purposes of ambition in Great Britain, as ever the factions of the Blue and Green were at Constantinople, or the Guelfs and Gibellines in Italy: they painted themselves, under the denomination of Whigs, as the true friends of liberty and the constitution; and represented the administration, the forces, the Jacobites, and the Scotch, as united and leagued together for the destruction of both. The portraits of weak princes, flagitious favorites, abandoned women, were from ancient and modern

modern history obtruded upon the people, in formal periodical and daily publications; and from thence imputations and surmises impressed upon the minds of the vulgar, as ungenerous and base, as false indecent and groundless: portraits that could only proceed from men as abandoned and lost to public honour and respect, as in private life they were to the tenderest social duties and the most obligatory ties of virtue and religion.—To Lord B—— was imputed the resignation of Mr P——, though no act was ever more freely and determinately the deed of the agent himself, than that was of Mr P——; and altho' the chiefs of the opposition, and every member present in the council, except Lord T——, were professedly and avowedly, by differing from him in opinion, as much the cause of it as that Lord.—Lord B—— was accused of engrossing the King's ear, when at no time ministers of every denomination breathed a freer air, had more the exertion of their own influence in their  
several

several departments, or any sovereign encouraged more the unrestrained exertion of that freedom.—The number of Scotch introduced into the army, and especially those highlanders who had been formerly in the rebellion of 1745, were imputed to him as another crime, altho' both the one and the other happened before he was in the administration, having been brought about under the direction and leading of the Duke of N—— and Mr P——; nay, altho' the nation stood in the utmost need of them, and their service gave the greatest satisfaction; and altho' the measure itself was not only judicious, but popular; and at the time it was taken, most highly approved of by the leaders of this very opposition.—To this Lord B— was imputed the very reverse of every thing he professed, of every thing he aimed at; nor could the most fair and unblemished conduct throughout the whole of his past life, save him from being represented by calumny in the interest of the pretender, in the interest of the French King, an enemy  
to

to the constitution, the promoter of arbitrary government; and that he and his countrymen the Scotch, had no right to employments and places of any kind, as being foreigners and enemies to Englishmen and their laws.—All these things, incredible in themselves, and contradictory to fact, were enforced, in defiance of common sense, with shameless intrepidity, and by all the arts and allurements of the most fertile and foul imagination. Poetry and prose were united to attract the public attention in favour of this enormous system of falsehood; and the combined influence and credit of the emissaries of faction were exerted to the utmost for the same purpose.—They will recollect, and on recollection acknowledge, that all these virulent assertions without any evidence, and many of them in their very nature contrary to truth, were but the ungenerous arts of the engines of a party to gain their chieftains and themselves popularity, and to overset the beneficent salutary and truly patriot intention of their Prince in favour of  
of

of his people, that a few individuals might again recover the reins of government, rule by the maxims of faction, and keep the nation, as formerly, divided, discontented and weak.

THIS will further appear to be the case, from the indecent noise and clamour raised about the cyder act, in which if there was any error, the parliament, and not Lord B—, were accountable for it; from their redoubled efforts of abuse against this nobleman, even after he had resigned his place in the administration, and retired into private life; from the outrageous insult committed upon His Majesty's speech to parliament; from the flimsy disguise of affected regard to the liberties of the people upon the subject of general warrants, by a man who has most licentiously violated the majesty and rights of the whole legislature; from the foul gross and more than black-guard abuse poured forth upon His Majesty's ministers, when Lord B— was no more of that

X

num-

number ; and chiefly and above all from the conduct of the opposition, when His Majesty wanted in the course of last year Mr P— again in his service. This gentleman had stood nobly recollected in himself, unconnected with any private views, and intirely his own master, till in an evil hour in the summer of 1763 he was brought within the vortex of the opposition ; so that when the King wanted to honour him with his favour, and employ him in his service, he appeared to be so fettered by his late connections, as to be induced most ungenerously to demand terms and conditions of capitulation from his Sovereign ; to demand the dismissal of some of his ministers from their places, that certain chiefs of the opposition might occupy them in their room.—Reflecting on this, the whole world must acknowledge, how fully it proves, that the secret and primary aim of the opposition is to obtain an exclusive power in the administration ; to rule by the partial fury and prejudice of a party ; to make an instrument



ment of this great man for only accomplishing their own selfish purposes; and to embitter the reign of His Majesty, perplex his government, enfeeble the nation, disappoint or retard all the advantages naturally arising from the peace; and distress his ministers as far as their power and influence extend, until they can obtain this.—What pity that so able a man as Mr P—, in whom we would gladly wish to find no speck or stain: who, before this period, had, like the good Timoleon, exhibited a noble instance of public virtue and true greatness of mind: what pity, I say, that he should have been driving in the impetuous current of ambition, and seemingly to take hold of this twig of faction to vault again into the seat of government.—What pity that he should still be so fettered and restrained by these unhappy connections, as to be without the power of serving a Sovereign he loves, and by whom he is so much beloved and honoured.—Perceiving all this, the whole

servation, and even with many have justified their proceedings to themselves as fair laudable and the effects of genuine patriotism; I only say, and must conclude with this remark, that these dreadful consequences naturally flow from the opposition, upon the principles it is now made, and in the manner it has hitherto been conducted: that it is therefore their indispensable duty to think and judge and act, uninfluenced by the violent impulses of passion; to conform their judgment and conduct not to their own, but to the public interest; to oppose not men, on account of their having His Majesty's good grace and esteem, or for the sake of their places and the power that attends them, but measures that may deviate from or be opposed to the spirit of the constitution; to adhere to and support His Majesty in establishing his benevolent system, abolishing all party distinctions, and promoting the universal concord and felicity of his people; or if they will not  
 be

be active in this noble duty, at least not to obstruct those who are already engaged, or willing to engage in it. This truth is certainly clear, that inclined ever so much as some of these gentlemen may be to continue in the opposition, all the genuine lovers of liberty and the freedom of the constitution; all those who sincerely wish to see the nation prosperous in peace, victorious in war, a sure shield of defence to her friends, and a bullwark of terror against her foes, will martial themselves on the side of national unanimity and concord; on that side which endeavours to improve and make the most of all those great advantages we have obtained by the peace; on the side of order obedience and submission to the laws, which is the purest and most perfect liberty: and supported by these and his own royal intrepidity and perseverance, we may with the founded confidence hope to see His Majesty and the constitution triumph over every partial and selfish interest,

terest, over all the wayward pursuits and attempts of faction and ambition, to the full establishment, the glory grandeur and felicity of Great Britain, so as to endear to all posterity the auspicious reign of our truly British Prince and Patriot King.

F I N I S.



1



—

